



C A L I F O R N I A

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

# ARMED AND PROHIBITED PERSONS SYSTEM REPORT 2024

*ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE  
SB 94 LEGISLATIVE REPORT  
CALENDAR YEAR 2024*



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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## *The Armed and Prohibited Persons System*

In 2006, California became the first and only state in the nation to monitor individuals who legally purchased or acquired firearms and later failed to relinquish those firearms after they became legally prohibited from owning or possessing them. The Armed and Prohibited Persons System (APPS) database cross-references the California Department of Justice (DOJ) databases of recorded firearm purchasers against other records identifying individuals who have become prohibited from owning or possessing firearms. Together, these record systems identify individuals who legally acquired firearms, became prohibited from keeping them, and then failed to relinquish those firearms as required by law. It is essential to note, DOJ's APPS system includes records identifying gun owners in California based on all legal firearm transaction records; individuals in the system only become APPS cases when they are identified as prohibited and illegally armed. DOJ utilizes Crime Analysts, Special Agents, and Special Agent Supervisors to locate and seize firearms from illegally armed prohibited persons identified through the APPS database, thereby preventing and reducing incidents of violent crime.

## *Why the APPS Database is Important*

Under California and federal law, individuals may become legally prohibited from owning and possessing firearms as a result of certain criminal convictions, probation conditions, active court protection or restraining orders, mental health-related events or adjudications, and certain other events. When a firearm owner becomes prohibited from keeping firearms they own or possess, California law generally requires that individual to promptly surrender their firearms and provide documentation to a court and/or law enforcement agency to verify that they did so.

- For example, when a court issues a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (DVRO) or a Gun Violence Restraining Order (GVRO) in California, the individual subject to that restraining order is generally required to immediately relinquish any firearms they own, possess, or control to a law enforcement officer who serves them with the restraining order, or to otherwise relinquish their firearms to a law enforcement officer or licensed firearms dealer within 24 hours of service.<sup>1</sup> The law enforcement officer or firearms dealer who takes possession of those firearms is required to issue a signed receipt to the individual documenting the firearm transfer, and the individual must then file the receipt within 48 hours of service with the court that issued the restraining order and the law enforcement agency, if any, that served the order.<sup>2</sup> If the individual fails to comply with these requirements, they may be subject to fines and criminal penalties,<sup>3</sup> and courts may issue warrants authorizing law enforcement officers to search for and recover their illegally retained weapons.<sup>4</sup>

If the prohibited individual fails to comply with the law and local law enforcement does not promptly separate the firearms from the individual, that individual is flagged as a prohibited person in possession of a firearm in the APPS database. The APPS database plays an integral role in this mission – by enabling DOJ and other law enforcement agencies to identify people across California who become prohibited yet remain in illegal possession of their firearms and to perform law enforcement operations in order to recover firearms from these prohibited individuals.

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1 Cal Fam Code § 6389(c); Cal Pen Code § 18120(b).

2 Id. In DVRO cases, a standard [DV-800 form](#) may be used as the firearm relinquishment compliance receipt; for GVRO cases, the a similar [GV-800 form](#) may be used.

3 Cal Fam Code § 6389(c), (n); Cal Pen Code §§ 18120(b), 18205.

4 Cal Pen Code § 1524(a)(11), (a)(14).

## The Ultimate Goal of APPS

The APPS program is a crucial component of California’s strategy to prevent gun violence. APPS enforcement efforts are essential to protecting public safety for all Californians, especially targeted survivors of violence and abuse, who are at significantly higher risk of being coercively controlled, threatened, or killed when a dangerous prohibited person retains illegal access to firearms.

The APPS database is not only the first of its kind, but also remains one of the only databases of armed prohibited individuals in the nation. It provides California law enforcement with an exceptional tool to identify armed and prohibited persons and enables DOJ and its partners to lead one of the only state programs in the country focused on systematically investigating and removing firearms from illegally armed individuals. As a result of this program, each year California dissociates thousands of illegally armed individuals from their firearms. These individuals are dissociated from their firearms either through removal of all firearms, or confirmation that they are no longer in possession of the associated firearms. In 2024, DOJ removed a record 4,058 individuals from the APPS database of armed and prohibited persons due to these enforcement efforts; this represented an 18% increase compared to 2023 and a nearly 44% increase compared to enforcement-related APPS removals in 2020. Through its data collection and this annual report, the APPS program also presents Californians with a more complete picture of the state’s progress and challenges in addressing gun violence.

However, each year, thousands more individuals become new, illegally armed APPS subjects after they fail to comply with the mandated relinquishment processes spelled out in California law. In 2024, there was a particularly large increase: over 12,000 individuals were newly added to the APPS database of illegally armed individuals. Most of these individuals became prohibited because of a criminal conviction, court protection and restraining order, or other court adjudication that required them to provide proof of firearm relinquishment compliance to the court within clear timelines. They failed to do so. The best time to remove a firearm from a prohibited person is at or near the time they become prohibited, such as when a local law enforcement officer serving a court restraining order takes immediate possession of the restrained person’s firearms, or when courts and probation officers ensure criminal defendants relinquish all firearms prior to final sentencing. Not only does this strategy increase public and survivor safety, it also prevents the need for DOJ to conduct a potentially more costly and lengthy APPS investigation.

Individuals only become APPS cases when a person who legally possesses a firearm becomes prohibited from owning firearms and the firearm is *not* immediately relinquished. to immediately relinquish those weapons. While the APPS system remains an essential safety net, the best gun violence reduction strategy requires robust efforts to remove firearms from prohibited individuals *before* they become APPS cases. As described in more detail in the Legislative Recommendations section below, California has made important progress and investments to develop more proactive and coordinated local firearm relinquishment compliance programs. Building on and investing in these best practice efforts to ensure armed individuals relinquish firearms at the time of prohibition is critical to significantly reduce the number of people who become illegally armed APPS subjects, and to meaningfully reduce the amount of time before any firearms are removed from such individuals.

It is also important to emphasize that the APPS database does not identify all individuals who are *illegally* armed in California. The APPS database flags individuals who failed to relinquish firearms identified in DOJ’s databases of *legally recorded* firearm sales and transactions. These databases generally do *not*:

- Include records of *illegally* acquired firearms, such as ghost guns;<sup>5</sup>
- Include records for most long guns that were legally acquired prior to 2014; and
- Identify cases where a prohibited person is not the recorded owner of a firearm but has effective custody or control over firearms purchased by someone else.

When conducting enforcement actions to seize firearms identified in APPS, DOJ enforcement teams often recover non-APPS firearms, including ghost guns and other illegally acquired weapons, from individuals who were identified as illegally armed in APPS. The APPS program plays a vital role in seizing firearms from many illegally armed individuals in California — at the same time, resources for DOJ and other stakeholders to investigate and recover other illegal firearm cases, including illegal ghost gun manufacturing, are critical.

The ultimate goal of APPS is simple: To increase public and survivor safety by ensuring the number of illegally armed and prohibited persons in the database remains as low as possible. While DOJ APPS enforcement efforts play an important role in that effort, local law enforcement, courts, and other stakeholders must treat prompt and consistent firearm relinquishment compliance as a safety priority and use available resources to ensure that firearm relinquishments are carried out effectively and as soon as an armed individual becomes prohibited.

As local firearm relinquishment efforts and partnerships continue to expand and improve, DOJ can reallocate resources to expand its focus to a broader range of firearms investigations aside from APPS cases, including gun trafficking, ghost gun manufacturing, and illegally possessed firearms not identified in APPS.

## **APPS Legislative Reporting Requirements**

State law requires DOJ to issue an annual APPS Report. The authority and specifications for this public reporting were initially established in Senate Bill (SB) 140 (Stats. 2013, ch. 2), which expired in 2019, and were reestablished with further specifications under SB 94 (Stats. 2019, ch. 25) in 2019. SB 94, which added section 30012 to the California Penal Code, requires DOJ to report specified information related to the APPS database, including the number of individuals in the APPS database and the degree to which the backlog of armed prohibited individuals in the APPS database has been reduced or eliminated. In this report, the term “backlog” is used in accordance with the definition created by SB 94 and codified in Penal Code section 30012, subdivision (a)(4): the number of cases for which DOJ did not initiate an investigation within six months of the case<sup>6</sup> being added to the APPS database or a case for which DOJ has not completed investigatory work within six months of initiating an investigation.

Prior to the passage of SB 94, DOJ communicated to the Department of Finance (DOF) and the Legislature that the current firearms database systems did not have the capability required to collect and report on the backlog as defined by SB 94, and certain other metrics newly required by SB 94. In response, DOJ worked with DOF to submit a Budget Change Proposal (BCP) requesting funding to

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5 For more information about ghost guns, see the DOJ’s Office of Gun Violence Prevention Report, “California’s Fight Against the Ghost Gun Crisis: Progress and New Challenges” (October 2024), [www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ogvp-report-ghost-guns.pdf](http://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ogvp-report-ghost-guns.pdf).

6 Within the APPS database, a ‘case’ refers to one individual; therefore, the terms ‘case’ and ‘individual’ will be used interchangeably in this report.

support the upfront planning and analysis costs to determine how to create an updated database system with the ability to track the requested data. DOJ has received the resources for the analysis phase of the modernization project. Once DOJ completes the analysis and secures additional funding for implementation, it will begin the upgrade process for the APPS database and other firearms information technology (IT) systems.

## **APPS Database Analysis for 2024**

- **Removals, Additions, and Incarcerations:** In 2024, DOJ removed 9,559 people from the APPS database of armed and prohibited persons.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, 12,019 people were added to the APPS database of armed and prohibited persons. A combination of factors resulted in a large increase in the number of individuals who were identified as subject to state or federal firearm prohibitions in 2024.<sup>8</sup> As of January 1, 2025, the APPS database contained 25,911 armed and prohibited persons. In addition to the 25,911 armed and prohibited persons, there were 1,260 additional armed and prohibited persons who were prohibited in APPS but currently incarcerated as of January 1, 2025.<sup>9</sup>
- **Active and Pending Cases:** As of January 1, 2025, the APPS database of armed and prohibited persons includes 10,044 Active cases and 15,867 Pending cases. Active cases have not yet been investigated or are in the process of being investigated. Pending cases have been thoroughly analyzed, and all investigative leads have been exhausted. The Pending cases include 1,719 individuals who are prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law only and 4,269 individuals who moved out of state.
- **Removals Due to Enforcement:** In 2024, DOJ removed a record 4,058 individuals from the APPS database of armed and prohibited persons due to enforcement efforts verifying that such individuals were disassociated from all known firearms. This represented an 18% increase compared to 2023 and a nearly 44% increase compared to enforcement-related APPS removals in 2020.
- **Staff:** In 2024, DOJ's Bureau of Firearms (BOF) had between 34-42 Special Agents and between 11-13 Special Agent Supervisors working to address the number of armed and prohibited individuals.

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7 The APPS database of armed and prohibited persons is a subset of the larger APPS database, which records all known firearm owners in California. Armed and prohibited individuals make up fewer than 1% of recorded firearm owners in California. Individuals are removed from APPS if they are no longer identified as armed and prohibited persons, which may occur if they are disassociated from all known firearms, if their firearm prohibition expires, or if they become deceased.

8 This increase was driven by a combination of factors, including legislation creating new misdemeanor prohibitions, increases in the number of individuals with firearm records known to DOJ, increases in the number of prohibiting events such as convictions and restraining orders, local record auditing efforts to identify and report previously unreported prohibiting events, as well as certain state and federal process changes related to individuals subject to outstanding felony arrest warrants and criminal protective orders.

9 While technically in a Pending status, incarcerated individuals represent a unique population that cannot be investigated until released from incarceration and moved to Active status. Therefore, incarcerated individuals are counted separately for the purposes of this report and are not figured in the Pending case statistics. See Page 13 for further discussion.



- **Reasons for Prohibitions (on January 1, 2025):** The statistics below outline the number of armed and prohibited individuals in each prohibiting category of the APPS database on January 1, 2025. Persons can be prohibited under more than one category if they have been the subject of multiple separate prohibiting events, which is why the total number exceeds 100%.<sup>10</sup>
  - 12,464 (48.1%) were prohibited due to a felony conviction
  - 5,638 (21.8%) were prohibited due to the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 922)<sup>11</sup>
  - 4,995 (19.3%) were prohibited due to mental health-triggering events
  - 4,259 (16.4%) were prohibited due to a protection and restraining order
  - 2,521 (9.8%) were prohibited due to a qualifying misdemeanor conviction
  - 495 (1.9%) were prohibited per the conditions of their probation
- **Protection & Restraining Orders:** A majority of all armed and prohibited individuals added to APPS during 2024 (62.5%) and removed from APPS during 2024 (50.5%) were prohibited under court protection and restraining orders, such as Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, Emergency Protective Orders, Gun Violence Restraining Orders, and Criminal Protective Orders. These firearm-prohibiting court orders expire much faster on average than most other prohibiting categories. In 2024, individuals subject to protection and restraining orders represented 69% of individuals removed from APPS because their prohibition expired; 31% removed from APPS due to enforcement efforts; and 16.4% of those actively armed and prohibited on January 1, 2025.
- **Investigated Individuals:** In 2024, DOJ investigated 8,501 individuals who were identified as armed and prohibited persons in the APPS database.
- **Firearms Recovered:** In 2024, DOJ recovered 1,520 firearms through APPS operations/seizures. Of these, 881 (58%) were firearms identified in the APPS database and 639 (42%) were non-APPS firearms. Non-APPS firearms are those not known to be associated with the prohibited person but are found in that person’s possession.
- **Ammunition Denials:** In 2024, DOJ received reports of 191 armed and prohibited individuals who attempted to purchase ammunition and were denied by background check. Agents and Crime Analysts investigated and closed 115 of these denial cases. The remainder of the denials remain under investigation.

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10 Individuals who become prohibited under multiple categories due to the same prohibiting event are only reported in one category: for instance, individuals prohibited due to a felony conviction are not also reported under the federal Brady Act category. Individuals who become prohibited due to multiple separate prohibiting events are reported in multiple categories, however; for example, individuals who become prohibited due to a felony conviction and who then also separately become subject to a protection order may be reported in both categories.

11 This category includes individuals who are prohibited under federal law only. It also generally includes individuals who are subject to both federal and state law firearm prohibitions in circumstances where the federal firearm prohibition outlasts the state firearm prohibition. For example, individuals convicted prior to 2019 of certain domestic violence-related misdemeanors are prohibited from possessing firearms for 10 years after conviction under California law and permanently under federal law.

## Recommendations Summary

California has made significant strides in improving its firearm relinquishment framework in recent years, including enacting landmark legislation following the recommendations in previous APPS reports. These legislative efforts are nation-leading and have played an important role in strengthening public safety and protecting targeted survivors of violence and abuse. DOJ is grateful for the partnership of the Governor and Legislature in making these improvements, as well as investments in programs (such as the Firearm Relinquishment Grant Program) that support them.

However, additional work remains to build on this progress, both to increase the APPS program's capacity and, importantly, to bolster local efforts to promote firearm relinquishment compliance and enforcement as soon as possible after a criminal conviction, court protection order, or other firearm-prohibiting event. Bolstering these local efforts is critical to significantly reduce:

- The number of people who become illegally armed APPS subjects in the first place; and
- The amount of time that individuals are illegally armed in our communities before they are identified, and firearms are successfully removed from their possession.

### Background:

As described above, California law increasingly contemplates that courts and local law enforcement must play a proactive and coordinated role in facilitating firearm relinquishment at the time that a person who possesses firearms becomes prohibited from keeping them. Most illegally armed APPS subjects are individuals who were ordered by a court to follow specific steps and timelines for relinquishing their weapons after a criminal conviction or court order. These individuals were typically ordered by the court to provide proof of relinquishment to the court and local law enforcement by submitting standard verification forms signed by a licensed firearms dealer or law enforcement officer attesting that the individual relinquished their weapons to that dealer or officer. Courts or local law enforcement interact with prohibited people at the time of prohibition and either receive verification forms showing firearm relinquishment compliance or are uniquely equipped to respond when they do not. California's recent legislative efforts have focused on expanding resources and requirements for courts and law enforcement to more proactively support prohibited people in understanding how to comply with these requirements and to more proactively identify and remove firearms from individuals who fail to do so.

While the level of proactive compliance varies throughout the state, some jurisdictions in California are developing nation-leading best practices and partnerships to promote relinquishment compliance and prevent people from becoming or remaining illegally armed. For example, with local investments and state funding through the Firearm Relinquishment Grant Program and, to a more limited extent, the Byrne State Crisis Intervention Program Grant, some courts and law enforcement agencies have launched new, coordinated partnerships and task forces with staff positions focused specifically on firearm relinquishment efforts. For example, some of these programs have:

- Funded new court administrative positions focused on informing prohibited people about how to relinquish weapons and more consistently identifying individuals who are armed and who fail to provide the court with the mandated proof of relinquishment compliance.
- Created additional court officer positions to conduct firearm relinquishment compliance review hearings in cases where a respondent has been ordered to relinquish firearms.



- Created additional law enforcement positions or units focused on protecting victim-survivors by promptly serving firearm-prohibiting court orders and recovering firearms from the prohibited person at the time of service.
- Deployed prosecution efforts focused on promoting relinquishment compliance and holding illegally armed individuals accountable in appropriate cases.

DOJ's BOF and Office of Gun Violence Prevention have actively supported the development of these programs and encourage all communities to treat and resource firearm relinquishment as a safety priority, including by establishing firearm relinquishment partnerships and task forces supported by dedicated positions focused on these efforts. Communities can promote more consistent relinquishment compliance by adopting standard local safety plans and/or agency protocols so all relevant stakeholders, including local law enforcement officers, are consistently informed about their role and responsibilities in promoting firearm relinquishment, including under newly adopted legislation such as SB 320 (Eggman, 2021), AB 818 (Petrie-Norris, 2023), AB 732 (Fong, 2023), and SB 899 (Skinner, 2024).<sup>12</sup>

DOJ's APPS enforcement teams play a vital role and have decades of leadership and expertise in safely removing firearms from illegally armed people. Nevertheless, the APPS program is not designed or resourced at scale to perform this essential safety work alone. It must be considered a safety net. Courts and local law enforcement agencies are the first line of defense. Though burdened, they must treat firearm relinquishment compliance as a safety priority. Without a more proactive, coordinated prioritization of relinquishment compliance at the local level, California will continue to see year-over-year increases of illegally armed APPS subjects possessing firearms in violation of state law and court order.

Proactive local firearm relinquishment compliance efforts are also vital because they can help identify when prohibited people have firearms, such as ghost guns, that do not appear in DOJ databases, which record only *legal* firearm ownership transactions. The APPS program cross-references DOJ databases to identify individuals who fail to relinquish firearms associated with them in DOJ's databases of legal firearm transactions. As described above, these databases generally do not include records of illegally acquired firearms like ghost guns, or of most long guns legally acquired prior to 2014; in cases like these, courts and local law enforcement agencies may have additional information about firearms that do not appear in DOJ databases, and which must be relinquished to protect survivors and public safety.

For example, in a Domestic Violence Restraining Order case, a survivor seeking protection from the court may present information showing that an abusive spouse owns and threatened her with an illegally acquired ghost gun; if that weapon was not legally acquired, it would likely not appear in DOJ databases as a recorded legal firearm transaction. In other words, the abusive armed respondent would likely not be identified as illegally armed in APPS at all, unless that respondent also possessed other, legally acquired firearms recorded in DOJ databases. In that case, the court hearing evidence regarding the illegal ghost gun would be uniquely equipped to make findings that the restrained party possesses firearms—and to proactively protect the survivor and the public by ensuring that he relinquishes *all* firearms in his possession, custody, or control.

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<sup>12</sup> See Appendix B for additional legislative history relative to the APPS database and firearm relinquishment.

## Recommendations:

After conducting an examination of the APPS program, DOJ recommends the following steps to improve the removal of firearms from prohibited persons.

- 1) Promote Consistent Firearm Relinquishment at the Time of Conviction:** Consider funding the mandate<sup>13</sup> that courts, through probation departments, as well as local law enforcement agencies, ensure criminal defendants relinquish all firearms prior to final sentencing when an individual becomes prohibited due to a felony or qualifying misdemeanor conviction. Investing in this approach would help ensure firearms are effectively and safely removed from prohibited criminal defendants at the safest time — at the time of conviction.

*Reason for recommendation:* California has enacted clear, mandatory processes and timelines for people convicted of firearm-prohibiting crimes to verify that they relinquished all firearms in their possession. Penal Code section 29810, initially added to the Penal Code by Proposition 63, also provides clear mandates for courts and probation departments to ensure that people convicted of such crimes do not remain illegally armed. This law places important mandates on probation officers in particular, who are required to identify defendants who possess firearms, facilitate firearm relinquishment with the prohibited defendant, receive firearm relinquishment verification forms, and report to courts prior to final sentencing regarding whether relinquishment occurred. However, local governments and probation departments often lack the necessary resources to ensure consistent compliance with these mandates and/or to properly update required law enforcement databases to record when relinquishment has occurred. Consequently, many individuals convicted of a prohibiting crime continue to illegally own guns after their conviction; about 60% of armed prohibited persons in APPS on January 1, 2025, were prohibited due to a criminal conviction. Additional resources, training, and coordination between courts, probation departments, and local law enforcement would help reduce the number of people who remain armed after a criminal conviction.

- 2) Promote Consistent Firearm Relinquishment at the Time a Restraining Order Issues:** Developing and funding a statewide, county-level firearm relinquishment system could ensure designated personnel are responsible for coordinating firearm relinquishment efforts and promoting more consistent service and enforcement of firearm-prohibiting restraining orders and other court orders in the county.

*Reason for recommendation:* If local LEAs could more consistently facilitate relinquishment and recover firearms from restrained individuals immediately upon service of the various types of restraining orders, it could significantly reduce the number of individuals who become illegally armed each year and ensure that court protection and restraining orders provide meaningful protection to survivors of violence and abuse as soon as possible.

As detailed in other DOJ reports,<sup>14</sup> California's court protection and restraining order processes play a vital role in protecting survivors of violence and abuse and disarming individuals who have demonstrated a significant danger to self or others. Many protection orders last for a relatively short period of time to provide protection during emergency or crisis periods or to promote safe separation from an abusive relationship. Because many of these protection orders expire within days or weeks, they represent a smaller percentage of APPS cases actively in effect at any given time compared to much longer-term prohibitions

13 See Cal. Penal Code section 29810.

14 See DOJ Office of Gun Violence Prevention, "Pathways to Safety: California's Nine Court Protection Orders to Prevent Gun Violence" (Jun. 2024), [www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/OGVP\\_Restraining%20Order%20Report.pdf](http://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/OGVP_Restraining%20Order%20Report.pdf).

that typically follow a criminal conviction or mental health-related adjudication. But court protection orders represent a large percentage of the individuals who become newly prohibited each year and are a major focus for APPS enforcement efforts. California has enacted clear, mandatory processes and timelines for people who become subject to these court orders to verify that they relinquished all firearms in their possession, custody, or control. However, unlike in the criminal conviction context (where probation officers are required to facilitate firearm relinquishment and report noncompliance to the court), there is often no one responsible for coordinating firearm relinquishment information and compliance in the context of a protection order case. Courts and local law enforcement agencies may not have the resources to proactively ensure that these court orders are promptly served on respondents and that people subject to such orders promptly relinquish all firearms. A lack of accessible county-level information about individuals subject to firearm-prohibiting court orders has also sometimes impeded their ability to identify non-compliance and take action at the local level. The Legislature has recently helped support and fund more coordinated and proactive local efforts to serve and enforce firearm-prohibiting court orders, as discussed in more detail on Page 54, and has enacted multiple new laws to codify best practices in this context, including SB 899, which was endorsed by Attorney General Bonta and will take effect January 1, 2026. Multiple counties receiving Firearm Relinquishment Grant Program funds are developing best practices and reporting promising results; however, future state funding for this program is now uncertain.<sup>15</sup>

County-level firearm relinquishment programs could build on these efforts by designating personnel responsible for managing local firearm relinquishment efforts and developing standard processes and record systems to identify non-compliance and ensure firearms are removed from prohibited persons who pose a threat to their communities. Investing in county-level firearm relinquishment programs at the state and local level would reduce the number of prohibited persons at the source. If local LEAs could seize the firearms from these individuals upon service of the various types of restraining orders and promptly update the California Law Enforcement and Telecommunications System (CLETS) record systems, it would reduce new additions of armed and prohibited persons in the APPS database. DOJ also encourages local governments and law enforcement agencies to develop local safety plans and/or agency protocols to provide clear and consistent guidance about firearm relinquishment laws and responsibilities, including new laws that require local law enforcement officers to serve court protection and restraining orders upon request from a petitioner and to facilitate firearm relinquishment from the restrained person immediately at the time of service.

- 3) Prioritize Competitive Salaries:** Improve the recruitment and retention of Special Agents and Special Agent Supervisors who perform APPS enforcement by offering compensation competitive with other LEAs.

*Reason for recommendation:* Despite recent pay increases, Special Agent pay at DOJ has not reached parity with comparable positions statewide. Traditionally, proof of graduation from a police academy training program constitutes the main requirement for applicants seeking positions in law enforcement. However, DOJ's Special Agent requirements are significantly more rigorous. In addition to graduating from a police academy, Special Agents are required to have spent one to two years in law enforcement and, in many cases, have attended or graduated from college. However, entry-level Special Agents are paid less than

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<sup>15</sup> The Legislature demonstrated its commitment to this program and purpose area by including up to \$15 million per year to continue funding the Firearm Relinquishment Grant Program through AB 28 (Gabriel), which establishes a pathway for ongoing investments from a new Gun Violence Prevention and School Safety Special Fund for this and other gun violence prevention purposes starting in September 2025. However, at this early stage of implementation, the Department of Finance is not currently projecting sufficient revenue in that Special Fund to allocate any funding for the Firearm Relinquishment Grant Program in the next two budget years.

those in LEAs that do not have these same requirements. Consequently, DOJ struggles to recruit and retain qualified Special Agents. California law ensures that salaries for sworn personnel at another state law enforcement agency match the average salary of other large law enforcement agencies “in order to recruit and retain the highest qualified employees.”<sup>16</sup> Promoting similar pay parity for DOJ sworn personnel would help DOJ improve recruitment and retention of highly qualified employees. Moreover, agents who do this work should be competitively compensated for their efforts. More fully staffed DOJ APPS enforcement teams could investigate and close more APPS cases, recover more illegal firearms, and provide more training and assistance to local agencies in future APPS work.

- 4) Modernize the APPS Database:** The project team has progressed to Stage 3, the Solution Development phase that covers the procurement activities to select vendors for the solution implementation phase for the (Firearms Information Technology Systems Modernization) FITSM Project.<sup>17</sup> Stage 3 activities include identification of the business and technical requirements for the solution, data analysis, and cleanup processes. The project is expected to identify many positive solutions to various firearms systems, including the APPS database.

*Reason for recommendation:* As outlined in the “The APPS and Legislative Reporting Requirements” section on Page 2, DOJ’s current firearms database systems are outdated and lack the modern capabilities needed to track the data required by SB 94 under Penal Code section 30012. Once DOJ receives full funding to complete the modernization project, the new system will enable DOJ to comply with legislative mandates, more efficiently investigate APPS cases, and fulfill its commitment to public safety.

- 5) Modernize the CARPOS System:** DOJ maintains the California Restraining and Protective Order System (CARPOS), a repository of vital information reported by courts and law enforcement agencies about protection and restraining orders issued statewide. Enhancements to this system and the CARPOS program were not included as part of the FITSM project to modernize DOJ’s firearm databases but could help promote firearm relinquishment efforts and survivor safety in important ways.

*Reason for recommendation:* DOJ maintains the CARPOS database, which provides courts and law enforcement agencies with access, through CLETS, to important details about court protection and restraining orders, including their terms and conditions, firearm prohibitions, expiration date, whether the respondent has received notice of the order, and who the order restrains and protects. This information is essential for safeguarding survivors of violence and abuse and informing law enforcement officers in the field. Information reported into the CARPOS database by courts and law enforcement statewide is also used by DOJ’s BOF for firearm and ammunition-related background checks and APPS purposes. CARPOS is particularly relevant to APPS since most individuals added to APPS each year are prohibited due to restraining orders. Additional funding and/or legislative authorization would be required to enhance the CARPOS system to address several relevant limitations to this system today. Enhancements could allow the system to more proactively capture firearm and relinquishment compliance information, including when courts find that a restrained person possesses or has custody or control of firearms that are not identified in DOJ databases. Funding and legislative authorization could also enable DOJ to develop an automated protected person information and notification system to provide survivors who obtain protection and restraining orders with automated access to information about their own case, including whether DOJ has received any record of their court order, whether the order has been successfully served on the restrained person, and whether the restrained

<sup>16</sup> See California Government Code section 19827.

<sup>17</sup> See the “Firearms Information Technology Systems Modernization (FITSM) Project” section on Page 17 for a more detailed overview of the different stages of the modernization project.

person has violated the court order and state law with respect to illegal firearm possession or attempted purchase.

- 6) Harness the Force Multiplier of Local LEA Collaboration:** Further establishing and funding statewide joint task forces with LEAs would be a force multiplier for DOJ that would ensure a more thorough coordinated effort to get firearms in the hands of prohibited persons off the street and ensure that the data in the APPS database is as current as possible.

*Reason for recommendation:* DOJ's APPS enforcement teams play a vital role and have decades of leadership and expertise in safely removing firearms from illegally armed people. However, the APPS program is not designed or resourced at scale to perform this essential safety work alone; much more proactive, coordinated prioritization of relinquishment compliance at the local level is needed to significantly reduce the number of people who become illegally armed APPS subjects in the first place and to reduce the amount of time before firearms are removed from non-compliant, illegally armed individuals.

In 2023, the Legislature enacted DOJ-sponsored AB 732 (M. Fong) to ensure that local law enforcement agencies and district attorneys have access through an electronic portal to information about armed and prohibited persons in their jurisdiction. This law also requires law enforcement agencies to designate specific personnel responsible for accessing this information and reporting to DOJ regarding efforts by that agency to recover firearms from armed and prohibited people in their jurisdiction.

DOJ has proactively made efforts to implement the recommendations outlined above. DOJ has:

- Expanded its recruitment efforts and lowered vacancy rates by hiring Special Agent Trainees and recruiting new Special Agents with law enforcement experience from state and local law enforcement agencies.
- Worked diligently to create partnerships with local LEAs.
- Created partnerships and worked cases with federal LEAs.
- Continued to provide data to DOJ's FITSM project team, consultant staff, and the California Department of Technology to make progress in the multi-year firearms database modernization project.

DOJ has also sponsored and supported legislation to strengthen firearm relinquishment processes and make grant funding available to courts and law enforcement agencies to focus on preventing prohibited people from remaining armed after a firearm-prohibiting conviction or court restraining order. Importantly, DOJ has also supported convenings, training, and stakeholder education efforts to help courts, law enforcement agencies, and other stakeholders understand the importance of firearm relinquishment efforts, and their associated responsibilities under state law. However, fully implementing the remaining recommendations will require legislative support, local implementation efforts, and additional resources.

**Further explanation of these recommendations can be found on page 46.**





# ANNUAL REPORT TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITTEE

## *The APPS and Legislative Reporting Requirements*

This report presents a statistical summary of the Armed and Prohibited Persons (APPS) database, as mandated by SB 94, for the period of January 1, 2024, to December 31, 2024. The report also contains additional in-depth analyses of data through the history of the APPS database and statistics to contextualize the APPS database and the workload that flows in and out of that system.<sup>18</sup>

Penal Code section 30000, subdivision (a) requires DOJ to maintain an “Armed and Prohibited Persons System.” This file is generated from the larger APPS database, which records all known firearm owners in California. The system also monitors various other databases for prohibiting triggering events (PTE), which are events that cause a person to become legally prohibited from owning or possessing firearms under California and/or federal law, such as a felony conviction or an active restraining order. The APPS program was created by legislation passed in 2001 (SB 950, Stat. 2001, ch. 944), and implemented in December 2006.

In 2013, the California Legislature passed SB 140, which appropriated \$24 million to DOJ over a three-year period to address the growing number of illegally armed prohibited persons identified in APPS. Additionally, SB 140 required DOJ to submit annual reports detailing the progress in reducing the backlog.

The APPS reporting provisions as outlined in SB 140 expired on March 1, 2019. In 2019, the legislature passed SB 94, which provided updated requirements regarding the mandated reporting of the APPS database statistics. Prior to the passage of SB 94, DOJ communicated to DOF that it did not have the technological capability to report on the new metrics required by SB 94 and would need funding to begin the planning analysis necessary to develop a system that could report on such metrics. Regardless, the new provisions went into effect on June 27, 2019, and are codified in Penal Code section 30012.

See Appendix B for additional legislative history relative to the APPS database and firearm relinquishment.

## *Overview of the APPS Database*

The APPS database contains information on firearms either legally acquired or registered in California and the owners of those firearms. Consistent with legislative mandates, the database results from records and information originating in the Dealer Record of Sale (DROS) database and the Automated Firearms System (AFS) database. Combined, those records represent individuals who purchased or transferred firearms legally and all legally recorded firearms associated with those individuals.<sup>19</sup>

Individuals are entered into the APPS database when they legally purchase or acquire a firearm, or when they otherwise submit records to DOJ reporting firearm acquisition or possession. They are marked or identified as prohibited in the database if a prohibiting event occurs. Prohibited persons are identified by running daily manual queries of the databases that cross-reference the population of known firearm owners against individuals who may have had a prohibiting triggering event (PTE) within

18 This report will use terms specific to the subject matter at hand. See Appendix A for the Relevant Key Terms and Definitions.

19 The APPS Database does not represent *all* individuals who have purchased or transferred firearms legally because California law did not require sales and transfers of long guns to be recorded until 2014. The APPS Database would therefore generally not identify individuals as being in possession of long guns they acquired prior to 2014.



the past 24 hours. New individuals who have legally purchased or acquired a firearm or who have had a triggering event are added and/or removed daily, creating a constantly changing dataset.

Armed and prohibited individuals are the primary focus of DOJ's enforcement efforts. However, they are a subset representing less than 1% of the larger APPS database of known firearm owners. As of January 1, 2025, there were 3,633,975 known firearm owners recorded in the APPS database, of which 25,911 are identified as illegally armed in the Armed and Prohibited Persons System. For DOJ to identify those armed and prohibited individuals, DOJ must first identify individuals who have legally acquired a firearm(s) and then identify which of those individuals are also prohibited due to a PTE.

Since the APPS system can only identify individuals who legally acquired their firearm(s) and whose record of sale was reported to DOJ, firearms obtained illegally are not accounted for in this database, though they may be seized as a result of an APPS-triggered investigation.

In recent years, a number of bills have been enacted expanding the offenses that prohibit firearm ownership or possession.<sup>20</sup> By expanding the number of prohibiting crimes, the Legislature has also increased the number of individuals added to the Armed and Prohibited Persons System each year. See Appendix B for legislative history relevant to APPS. Other factors such as ammunition eligibility checks, mandatory assault weapon registration, and increased firearm sales have also contributed to the surge of individuals identified as armed and prohibited. Prohibitions may be due to a felony conviction, domestic violence conviction, a qualifying misdemeanor conviction, mental health-based event, various types of civil or criminal protection and restraining orders, and other prohibitory categories. See Appendix E for firearm-prohibiting categories.

Within the Armed and Prohibited Persons System, cases are separated into the two categories of "Active" or "Pending."

Active cases have either not yet been investigated, or they are in the process of being investigated but all investigative leads have not yet been exhausted.

<sup>20</sup> See Appendix B for a legislative history as related to APPS

## Case Study

### Richmond Man Arrested for Being in Possession of Machine Guns, Assault Weapons, and Approximately 1,000,000 Rounds of Ammunition While Prohibited Due to a Workplace Violence Restraining Order



In January 2024, the Contra Costa Anti-Violence Support Effort (CASE) Task Force investigated a man who was prohibited from owning and possessing firearms and ammunition due to a Workplace Violence Restraining Order issued against him. The restraining order had been issued after the man brought a handgun to a hospital in Walnut Creek, California and threatened employees. The man had 61 firearms listed in his name in the Automated Firearm System. The CASE Task Force and the Bureau of Firearm's (BOF) Dublin office served a search warrant at the man's residence. As a result of the search warrant, agents seized 11 military style machine guns from .50 caliber to 7.62 caliber, two .50 caliber rifles, 133 handguns, 37 rifles, 60 assault rifles, seven shotguns, 20 silencers, four flare guns, 3,000 large capacity magazines and approximately 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition.

Pending cases have been thoroughly analyzed and all investigative leads were exhausted. Some examples of pending cases may be found below. For a detailed definition of the “pending category” please see Appendix A, Relevant Key Terms and Definitions.

- 1. Unable to Clear:** Cases that have been investigated by DOJ’s agents who have exhausted all investigative leads and remain unable to recover all firearms associated with the prohibited individual. The case will be moved to Active status if new information is identified.
- 2. Unable to Locate:** Cases in which DOJ’s agents have made at least three attempts to contact the individual but have not been able to locate them, even after exhausting all leads.
- 3. Out-of-State:** Cases in which DOJ’s agents have determined that the prohibited person no longer lives in California.
- 4. Federal Gun Control Act (Federal Brady Act Prohibition Only):** Cases where a person is prohibited only under federal law. State, county, and municipal law enforcement do not have authority to investigate a violation of the Federal Brady Act. Persons who have both a state and federal prohibition are not listed in this group.
- 5. Incarcerated:** Cases involving incarcerated individuals remain on the Pending list, but DOJ still tracks and monitors them. Once released, they are moved to Active status.

DOJ regularly verifies new or updated information on all Pending cases. If additional information becomes available on an APPS case in Pending status (e.g., the firearm(s) associated with the APPS individual are located, records indicate a new address for the individual, or the individual is released from incarceration), the case is evaluated and transitioned back into the Active status.


The current system includes 11 databases that do not communicate with one another or may only have one-way communication with another firearms database.<sup>21</sup> This requires a Crime Analyst to manually cross-reference records from one database to another while working to compile an individual package for investigation.

Of the 11 databases, only five feed into the APPS database for firearm association and prohibition determinations. These databases include:

<sup>21</sup> See Appendix D for a relational diagram of DOJ’s firearms databases.

**Case Study**

**Monrovia Subject with Criminal Protective Orders Arrested After Being Found with Firearms and Assault Weapons**



In March 2024, BOF identified an individual who was prohibited from owning firearms due to multiple criminal protective orders. The person had several firearms recorded in his name in the state’s Automated Firearm System. Agents conducted the investigation and obtained a search warrant for the individual’s residence in Monrovia, California. As a result of the search warrant, agents seized six handguns, eight rifles (including six assault weapons and one short-barreled rifle), two shotguns, 39 standard capacity magazines, eight large capacity magazines, and approximately 5,000 rounds of ammunition.

1. **Automated Criminal History System (ACHS):** Established in 1971, ACHS is the repository for state summary Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI).
2. **Wanted Persons System (WPS):** Established in 1971 as the first online system for DOJ, WPS is a statewide computerized file of fugitives for whom arrest warrants have been issued.
3. **Automated Firearms System (AFS):** Created in 1980 to identify lost or stolen firearms and to associate firearms with individuals. AFS tracks the serial number of every firearm owned by government agencies, handled by law enforcement (seized, destroyed, held in evidence, reported stolen, or recovered), voluntarily recorded, or handled by a firearms dealer through transactions. Prior to 2014, most entries in AFS were handguns. Since January 1, 2014, all new legally acquired firearms, both handguns and long guns, are entered into AFS.
4. **California Restraining and Protective Order System (CARPOS):** Created in 1991, CARPOS is a statewide database of individuals subject to restraining and protective orders. This system includes Domestic Violence Restraining Orders (DVRO), Gun Violence Restraining Orders (GVRO), and other types of firearm-prohibiting restraining and protective orders.
5. **Mental Health Reporting System (MHRS):** Established in 2012, MHRS is a web-based application used by Mental Health Facilities, Superior Courts, Juvenile Courts, and LEAs to report firearm prohibiting events related to mental health to DOJ.

The APPS database does not have the technological capability to automatically cross-reference all firearms databases; therefore, before creating a complete case package for investigation, Crime Analysts must manually cross-check multiple databases. The system is extremely cumbersome to operate. When a user retrieves a single case, all information must be verified before agents may take action. Such verification starts with confirming the individual's name, birth date, and driver's license number match across all systems. Then, using the Law Enforcement Agency Web (LEAWEB), the Crime Analyst will run multiple queries using the individual's driver's license number. LEAWEB is a California unique database that queries some of California's databases, including CARPOS, AFS, ACHS, MHRS, WPS, and the Supervised Release Files, as well as the databases of the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Each case is highly variable, and the circumstances and information pertinent to each case will determine how a Crime Analyst conducts their research. For example, an individual can be prohibited under multiple categories; the prohibiting category determines which databases a Crime Analyst must use to verify the prohibition is still current and that the case is workable by agents.

## Case Study

### TARGET Task Force Seizes Assault Pistols from a Prohibited Individual in Tulare



In March 2024, the TARGET (Tulare County Agencies Regional Gun Violence Enforcement Team) Task Force conducted an APPS investigation of an individual who was prohibited from possessing firearms due to a civil protection order. The individual had five firearms listed in the Automated Firearms System.

The TARGET Task Force contacted the individual at his residence in Tulare, California. Upon contact, task force members observed the individual carrying a concealed firearm. The individual was disarmed and taken into custody. The individual advised BOF Special Agents that he had additional firearms in his residence and gave consent for agents to search.

As a result of the search, task force personnel located and seized five APPS handguns, five non-APPS handguns, two assault pistols, four shotguns, five rifles, seven large capacity magazines, 15 standard capacity magazines, and approximately 700 rounds of live ammunition.



## **Firearms Information Technology Systems Modernization (FITSM) Project**

The existing firearms systems utilized by DOJ, LEAs, and other firearm stakeholders lack the modern capabilities DOJ needs to comply with current legislative mandates and fulfill its commitment to public safety. The systems currently in use were built many years ago — dating as far back as 1980 — and have been modified piecemeal over the years in response to various legislative mandates. Each system uses different logic, meaning inputs cannot be easily transferred from one database to another, and modifications cannot be applied across multiple systems. Consequently, problems and inefficiencies will persist and cause increased workloads and missed operational opportunities until DOJ can develop and implement the FITSM solution.

DOJ initiated the FITSM project in June 2020. DOJ submitted the Stage 2 Alternative Analysis (S2AA) planning, of the California Project Approval Lifecycle (PAL) to the California Department of Technology (CDT) for review and approval in February 2024. The S2AA was subsequently approved in October 2024. Stage 2 involved conducting an analysis of all firearm business processes and supporting systems. This included market research to determine a modern solution and an estimated timeline for the implementation of a new firearms system. The project team has progressed to Stage 3, the Solution Development phase that covers the procurement activities to select vendors for the solution implementation phase for FITSM. Stage 3 activities include identification of the business and technical requirements for the solution, data analysis, and cleanup processes. The project is expected to identify many positive solutions to various firearms systems, including the APPS database.

An example of the complexity of the existing firearms systems is highlighted below:

In the case of an individual who has only one firearm and is prohibited only by one restraining order, the process would be as follows:

1. The Crime Analyst must confirm the restraining order is in effect and that the individual was served either by being present in court or through service by a processor.
2. Once verified, the Crime Analyst will try to pull the restraining order from an external database, the California Courts Protective Order Registry (CCPOR).
3. CCPOR is meant to be a centralized registry for restraining orders in California; unfortunately, it has not been implemented across all county courts in the state. For courts that do not use CCPOR, DOJ's Crime Analyst must contact the court directly to attempt to obtain a copy of the restraining order. Having an original copy can provide valuable additional information. For example, confirming when, where, and how the restraining order was served, the individual's last known address, and whether the individual has already surrendered their firearm.
4. Assuming the individual is still in possession of their firearm, the Crime Analyst must then pull descriptive information for the firearm associated with the individual and run the firearm's serial number in the Automated Firearms System (AFS) database to confirm the individual is still associated with that firearm. The Crime Analyst may also have to establish there are no extenuating circumstances, such as a situation where the individual is no longer in possession of the firearm, but the databases do not reflect the change. This is sometimes caused by a keying error where a serial number is off by one digit, but all other information coincides. A keying error traditionally happens from data entry made by a firearms dealer, by the public via online reporting, or by LEAs that seize firearms. In such circumstances, additional administrative work must be done by DOJ to remove the association of the firearm from the individual.
5. Although LEA WEB queries the DMV, the query does not automatically pull an individual's

identification photo or associated vehicles. To obtain this information, the Crime Analyst must perform additional, separate steps to pull relevant information, such as the most recently reported place of residence, from DMV registries.

6. Once all information is confirmed, and assuming the information supports investigative efforts, the package is then ready for agents to conduct enforcement actions.

As noted, this outlined process is for the simplest case possible with one prohibition and one firearm. Most cases involve additional factors — such as additional firearms, prohibitions, combined federal and state prohibitions, and/or criminal history — which make a case package much more difficult to compile.

Planning efforts for the FITSM project include the replacement and modernization of the existing legacy infrastructure. DOJ is working to secure funding to complete Stages 3 and 4 and will continue to complete work towards vendor selection and initiating the implementation activities.

## **Enforcement Teams**

**Crime Analysts:** Each of DOJ’s BOF offices have teams of Special Agents for field operations. DOJ also employs Crime Analysts in each of its six BOF offices throughout the state.<sup>22</sup> The Crime Analysts access the APPS database daily and develop investigative packages of armed and prohibited people for each team of agents to contact. They are required to crosscheck several databases to confirm addresses, photos, arrest records, and the status of armed and prohibited individuals, among other relevant information. Using their knowledge and expertise, they translate vast amounts of data into actionable information, allowing the agents to conduct their investigations efficiently and effectively. The work is time-intensive and requires great attention to detail as errors (typos, accidental variations, incorrect information, etc.) can lead to incorrect decisions or unnecessary investigative contacts. Modernizing the firearms IT systems will allow for greater accuracy, which will bolster the success of investigative operations by ensuring agents and other law enforcement partners are provided with the most current information and avoid unnecessary contacts and risk.

**Special Agents:** Using these investigative packages, Special Agents attempt to locate the firearm(s) associated with each armed and prohibited individual via a consent search, probation or parole search, or a search warrant. Often, the armed and prohibited individual will have numerous firearms, many of which were not associated with that individual in the APPS database. This could be due to the individual having long guns purchased before long gun reporting requirements took effect in 2014, firearms loaned to them by another person, firearms imported into California from another state, antique firearms, illegally purchased firearms, ghost guns,<sup>23</sup> or stolen firearms.

**Partnerships with Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs):** Expanding partnerships with local LEAs will help to improve operation efficiency. Often, agents contact an armed and prohibited individual only to find that a local law enforcement agency has already seized the firearm(s) associated with that individual but neglected to enter the seized firearm into the Automated Firearms System (AFS) database, as required by Penal Code sections 11108.2 and 11108. Had the LEA entered that information into AFS, it would have removed the individual from the APPS database, allowing DOJ’s agents to focus on another case. Currently, DOJ must reach out to the LEAs to request they update AFS, or DOJ must ask for the police report to cross-check the firearms seized and match the associated firearms in the APPS database. Unless the information matches and is verified, the individual cannot be removed from the APPS database. In 2024, many APPS investigations conducted by DOJ involved firearms already in

<sup>22</sup> See Appendix F for a map of the various BOF regional office jurisdictions.

<sup>23</sup> Ghost guns are firearms made by an individual or group, without serial numbers or other identifying markings. Without a serial number, law enforcement cannot run a trace search on the firearm and the firearm does not have the legal requirements.

local law enforcement custody. The cost of such oversight cannot be recovered, resulting in duplicative efforts by DOJ that reduce efficiency and waste resources. DOJ's continued efforts to increase collaboration would help ensure the timely and accurate input of data by local LEAs in statewide data systems.

Successful models of operations with local law enforcement have been a force multiplier for the APPS program. For instance, the Contra Costa County Anti-Violence Support Effort (CASE) Task Force is a collaboration between various state, local, and federal agencies. In 2024, the CASE Task Force conducted 29 firearms-related investigations and confiscated 342 firearms, 28 which were APPS firearms.<sup>24</sup> As outlined in the recommendations, DOJ encourages these types of collaborative partnership operations and relationships with local LEAs.

In December 2020, DOJ established management and supervision of the Tulare County Agencies Regional Gun Violence Enforcement Team, also known as the TARGET Task Force. This addition to the DOJ task force model supports the value established through previous task force efforts, including the aforementioned CASE Task Force. In 2024, state and local agencies working with the TARGET Task Force conducted 200 firearms-related investigations and confiscated 125 firearms, 54 of which were APPS firearms. Like the CASE Task Force, the TARGET Task Force works collaboratively with local, state, and federal partners to conduct APPS investigations as well as other investigations to reduce gun violence.

In an effort to increase successful collaborative efforts, in August of 2024 DOJ signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ventura County Sheriff's Office to participate in the county's Gun Violence Prevention Program (GVRP) Task Force, to remove firearms from individuals who are prohibited in APPS and seize unlawful firearms within Ventura County. Since August of 2024, the GVRP Task Force conducted 70 firearms-related investigations and confiscated 152 firearms, 58 which were APPS firearms.<sup>25</sup>

Additional funding to expand this task force model would allow DOJ to amplify this collaborative work. DOJ has experienced the positive impact of working with local LEAs, allowing DOJ's agents to conduct more operations and remove additional firearms from prohibited armed persons more efficiently. DOJ stands ready to work with the Legislature and local, state, and federal law enforcement partners to replicate this success across the state.

**Case Study**

**Sutter County Woman Found in Possession of Firearms and Ammunition While Prohibited Due to a Civil Harassment Restraining Order**



In April 2024, BOF conducted an APPS investigation into an individual with a Civil Harassment Restraining Order. The individual had one firearm listed in her name in the Automated Firearms System. BOF agents made contact with the subject at her residence in Meridian, California. The subject consented to a search of her residence which resulted in the seizure of six handguns, eleven rifles, three shotguns, 10 standard capacity magazines, five large capacity magazines, and approximately 1,100 rounds of ammunition.

<sup>24</sup> For more on the CASE and TARGET task forces, refer to page 40.

<sup>25</sup> For more on the Ventura County GVRP, see page 42.



## **Mandated Statistics and Analysis**

Senate Bill 94 mandates the reporting of specific statistics for each calendar year. The mandated statistics for the current report include the following:

### **The Total Number of Individuals in the APPS Database**

As of January 1, 2025, the APPS database of recorded firearm owners contained 3,633,975 individuals, of which 25,911<sup>26</sup> were prohibited from owning or possessing firearms.

### **Breakdown of the Status of Active APPS Cases**

“Active cases” are those involving individuals believed to reside in the state of California, are prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm in the state for one or more reasons and have not yet been investigated or are in the process of being investigated, but all investigative leads have not yet been exhausted.

### **Status of the APPS Database Backlog**

As outlined above, the statutory mandate described in Penal Code section 30012, subdivision (a)(1)(A) (i) requires DOJ to report “the number of cases that have not been actively investigated for 12 months or longer, along with a breakdown of the time period that has elapsed since a case was added to the system.” As stated previously, DOJ alerted DOF prior to the passage of SB 94 that it would be unable to provide these metrics without the necessary funding to update the current firearms databases. While the FITSM project is ongoing, this continues to be the case.

SB 94 defined “backlog” as the number of cases for which DOJ did not initiate an investigation within six months of the case being added to the APPS database or for which it has not completed investigatory work within six months of initiating an investigation on the case. Once DOJ receives full funding to complete the FITSM project, the new system will be better able to accommodate reporting on the status of the backlog.

### **Breakdown of Cases in the APPS Database**


As of January 1, 2025, the APPS database contained 3,633,975 individuals recorded as owning or possessing firearms, of which 25,911 (less than 1%) were prohibited from owning or possessing firearms. The latter figure (25,911) is further subcategorized into Active and Pending cases. Active cases are those in which DOJ has not yet begun investigations or is in the process of investigating but has not yet exhausted all investigative leads. Pending cases are those investigations in which DOJ has thoroughly analyzed and exhausted all investigative leads or determined that the person is not within DOJ’s jurisdiction. As of January 1, 2025, there were 10,044 Active cases and 15,867 Pending cases. In addition to the Pending category, there are 1,260 incarcerated individuals. While technically in a Pending status, incarcerated individuals represent a unique population that cannot be investigated until released from incarceration and moved to Active status. Therefore, incarcerated individuals are counted separately for the purposes of this report and are not figured in the Pending case statistics that follow.

Figure 1 shows the number of prohibited people in the APPS database each year. The number of armed and prohibited persons in APPS increased by 10.4% between January 1, 2024, and January 1, 2025.

<sup>26</sup> This number excludes prohibited individuals who are known to own firearms but are also known to be incarcerated for six months or more. While incarcerated individuals are technically in the Pending status, it is assumed that they are not in possession of firearms while in custody and are therefore treated as a separate population. DOJ receives state prison incarceration statuses nightly and individuals released from state custody are moved into the Active status.

APPS enforcement activities significantly increased during 2024: there was a substantial 18% increase in the number of individuals removed from APPS in 2024 due to enforcement actions. At the same time, there was also a very large 39% increase in the number of armed individuals who became APPS subjects compared to the previous year.<sup>27</sup>

Figure 1. The number of prohibited people in the APPS database as of January 1 each year including both Active and Pending cases



### Breakdown of the Status of Pending APPS Cases

Prohibited individuals in the APPS database may be assigned a Pending status for one of four reasons:

1. **Unable to Clear (UTC):** The prohibited person has been investigated, and all leads have been exhausted, but agents have been unable to disassociate the individual from all known firearms.
2. **Unable to Locate (UTL):** Agents have made at least three attempts to contact the prohibited individual but have not been able to locate them, even after exhausting all leads.
3. **Out of State:** The prohibited individual has moved out of California.
4. **Federal Brady Act Prohibition Only:** The prohibited individual is prohibited due to a Federal Brady Act prohibition (18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 922) alone and DOJ does not have the jurisdiction to investigate them.

Of the 15,867 Pending cases, 7,113 (44.8%) were unable to be cleared, 2,766 (17.4%) were unable to be located, 4,269 (26.9%) moved out of state, and 1,719 (11.1%) were prohibited under Federal law only (Figure 3). The distribution of Pending cases among these reasons for Pending status is consistent with breakdowns in previous reporting years. Figure 2 shows the distribution of Pending and Active cases for the past five years.

<sup>27</sup> This increase was driven by a combination of factors, including legislation creating new misdemeanor prohibitions, increases in the number of individuals with firearm records known to DOJ, increases in the number of prohibiting events such as convictions and restraining orders, local record auditing efforts to identify and report previously unreported prohibiting events, as well as certain state and federal process changes related to individuals subject to outstanding felony arrest warrants and criminal protective orders.

Figure 2. Number and Relative Percentage of APPS Subjects by Active and Pending Status, 2020-2024





Figure 3. Pending APPS cases separated by category as of January 1, 2025



### Breakdown of the Number of Individuals Removed from the APPS

In 2024, 9,559 armed and prohibited people were removed from the Armed and Prohibited Persons System. Removals from the Armed and Prohibited Persons System occur for one of three reasons:

- 1. Prohibition Expired:** An individual’s prohibition expired, which could result from the expiration of restraining orders, the end of a 10-year prohibition that resulted from a qualifying misdemeanor conviction, or the end of a five-year prohibition that resulted from a mental health event.

2. **Disassociated from All Known Firearms:** The prohibited person has all of their known firearms disassociated from them, meaning each firearm attributed to them within the APPS database has been accounted for by DOJ and disassociated from the prohibited person.
3. **Deceased:** The prohibited person is deceased.

*Table 1. Individuals removed from the Armed and Prohibited Persons System in 2024 separated by reasons for removal*

Reason for Removal	Number of Individuals Removed
Prohibition expired/no longer prohibited	5,178
Disassociated from all known firearms	4,058
Deceased	323


If DOJ is unable to locate the prohibited person or disassociate all known firearms from the prohibited person, despite having exhausted all leads, DOJ cannot remove the individual from the Armed and Prohibited Persons System and must instead assign them to the Pending category. This often results from the inherent difficulty of confiscating firearms from individuals who are unwilling to surrender their firearms regardless of their prohibited status.

Additionally, DOJ does not generally have authority to seize firearms from individuals who are identified as illegally armed in APPS due to a prohibition that applies under federal law only, since these individuals are not in violation of California law. In these instances, such individuals remain in APPS as Pending cases.

Of the 9,559 prohibited people removed from the Armed and Prohibited Persons System this year, 4,058 removals were the result of enforcement efforts<sup>28</sup> — 609 more removals compared to 2023. This represents an increase of approximately 18%. Figure 4 shows the information breaking down why prohibited persons were removed from the APPS prohibited list. The overall percentage of total APPS removals due to enforcement efforts rose from 38.1% of all APPS removals in 2023 to 42.5% of all APPS removals in 2024, the highest proportion of APPS removals in the past four years. Removals due to enforcement efforts have increased over the past five years from 2,822 in 2020 to 4,058 in 2024 (33.7% of all removals, up to 42.5% of removals in 2024).

**Case Study**

**Convicted Felon in Clovis Found with Firearm and Ammunition Stockpile**



In October 2024, BOF identified a subject who was prohibited from owning or possessing firearms due to a felony conviction of insurance fraud. The subject had 100 firearms recorded in his name in the Automated Firearms System. Agents made contact with the individual at his residence in Clovis, California and the individual consented to a search of his residence. As a result of the search, agents located and seized 22 rifles, 61 handguns, one shotgun and approximately 38,000 rounds of ammunition.

<sup>28</sup> Note that not all 4,058 individuals who were disassociated from their firearms resulted in firearm seizures by DOJ. In some cases, DOJ investigations determined that local law enforcement agencies already seized the firearms but failed to record the recovery, the individual attempted to report the firearm lost/stolen, or the individual is in the process of lawfully selling or gifting the firearm to a friend or relative. For a breakdown of prohibition categories as a percentage of prohibited people see Figure 9 below.

It is important to note that the APPS system identifies persons with a prohibiting event that currently have access to known firearms. Therefore, if firearms are removed immediately by local agencies, a subject will drop out of the database of known firearm owners before becoming an armed and prohibited case. Therefore, fluctuations in removals due to enforcement efforts can result from changes at the local level. If local agencies improve firearm removal efforts, the number of subjects removed due to enforcement efforts may decrease since these cases would not reach the APPS database. If local agencies are removing fewer firearms, or there are increases in prohibitions that local agencies are unable to handle, more cases will reach the APPS database increasing this number.

The number and percentage of removals due to expiring prohibitions has also declined significantly from 5,291 (63.2%) in 2020 to 5,178 (54.2%) in 2024. An overwhelming majority of these cases involved short term prohibitions, especially from expiring emergency or temporary court protection and restraining orders; 50% of the cases removed from APPS due to a prohibition expiring had a prohibition length of less than 21.5 days. These cases can include situations where an emergency restraining order has not been served — or reported as served — at the local level which hampers DOJ's ability to enforce prohibitions.

Figure 4. Number and Relative Percentage of APPS Removals by Removal Reason, 2020-2024





Figure 5. APPS Removal Counts by Removal Type, 2020-2024



The monthly average number of individuals disassociated from their known firearms was approximately 338.<sup>29</sup> Enforcement efforts removed fewer prohibited individuals in the first half of the year, with an average of 324 removals per month from January through June, compared to an average 352 removals per month from July through December. The most productive month was October, with 419 prohibited individuals disassociated from all known firearms. In total, 12,019 prohibited individuals were added into APPS in 2024, the highest number since 2009.

### Case Study

#### Convicted Felon in Hesperia in Possession of Short Barreled Rifle


In October 2024, BOF conducted an APPS investigation into a convicted felon suspected of being in possession of firearms. The subject was a felon due to a conviction of vehicle theft. Upon contact at his residence in Hesperia, California, the subject was uncooperative and threatened the investigating agents. Agents obtained a search warrant for the residence and seized two rifles, a short-barreled rifle and approximately 10,000 rounds of ammunition.



<sup>29</sup> The standard deviation is approximately 46 individuals from month to month.



Figure 6. The yearly removals and additions from the APPS list as of January 1<sup>st</sup> of each year



### The Number of Recorded Firearm Owners in the APPS Database Before and After the Relevant Reporting Period

The relevant reporting period runs from January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024. The APPS database is a compiled list of all individuals who legally purchased, acquired, or registered a firearm in California. It further categorizes individuals as either persons armed but not prohibited, persons armed and prohibited, or persons incarcerated and known to have possessed a firearm prior to incarceration.

To account for late additions or removals from the system, the state of the APPS database was analyzed as of 1:30 a.m. Pacific Standard Time on January 1, 2025. At that time, the APPS database of recorded firearm owners contained 3,633,975 individuals, including 3,606,804 armed and not prohibited individuals, 25,911 armed and prohibited individuals, and 1,260 incarcerated individuals.


The number of recorded firearm owners in the APPS database grew by 142,512 in 2024. In other words, 142,512 more individuals became recorded firearm owners in California at some point during 2024, either through purchasing or acquiring a firearm through a licensed dealer or reporting a firearm in their possession. This number does not reflect existing firearm owners who acquired new firearms in 2024.<sup>30</sup>

The APPS database is highly dynamic, and newly armed and prohibited people continue to be added as many others are removed. This increase represents both prohibited and non-prohibited persons in the APPS database.

<sup>30</sup> The median annual increase between January 1, 2019, and January 1, 2025, was 144,242 additional recorded firearm owners per year. That annual growth is slightly lower than the mean annual increase of the last five years, which was 179,630.

Over the past decade, some legislative changes have likely increased the number of individuals with *recorded* firearm transactions. For example, California law generally did not require firearm dealers to record the sale or transfer of long guns with DOJ until January 1, 2014. Ghost gun reform legislation enacted in 2022 also required sales and transfers of federally regulated firearm precursor parts — as defined in Penal Code section 16519 — to be conducted and recorded by licensed dealers. In July 2019, California also implemented a law requiring background checks to purchase ammunition; individuals with a firearm ownership record may utilize the streamlined “Standard Ammunition Eligibility Check” process for the background check, which may have encouraged some individuals to record ownership of a previously unrecorded firearm (such as a rifle or shotgun they purchased prior to 2014). In addition to these legislative changes, many sources have documented substantial nationwide increases in gun sales during the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>31</sup>

Figure 7. The total number of recorded firearm owners in the APPS database as of January 1<sup>st</sup> of each year



### Breakdown of Why Each Person in the APPS Database is Prohibited from Possession of a Firearm

Persons become prohibited in the APPS database for several reasons. The following categories are the typical events, or PTEs, which can trigger a firearm prohibition:

- An individual may become prohibited under the Federal Brady Act. Note, some individuals prohibited under the Federal Brady Act may not be prohibited under California state law (e.g., a dishonorable discharge in the military).

31 For further discussion, see, e.g., DOJ Office of Gun Violence Prevention Data Report: The Impact of Gun Violence in California, Page 20 (“The Pandemic-Era Spike in Gun Sales”) (Aug. 2023), <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/OGVP-Data-Report-2022.pdf>.

- An individual may be prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm as a condition of their probation.
- Individuals with felony convictions are prohibited from owning firearms.
- A juvenile who becomes a ward of the court may be prohibited.
- Mental health crises involving involuntary commitment or certain other mental health-related adjudications or events may trigger a temporary prohibition.
- Some misdemeanor convictions may prohibit owning a firearm (generally for 10 years, or more permanently for certain domestic violence-related convictions).
- Individuals may be temporarily prohibited due to restraining orders.
- Individuals may be temporarily prohibited due to a felony warrant.
- Individuals may be temporarily prohibited due to a misdemeanor warrant.
- Individuals may be prohibited due to offenses or triggering events occurring in other states.

Many individuals are prohibited under several categories. The following is a breakdown by category for individuals prohibited in APPS as of January 1, 2025:<sup>32</sup>


- 12,464 people prohibited due to a felony conviction, representing 48.1% of all active and pending individuals in APPS.
- 5,638 (21.8%) are prohibited due to the Federal Brady Act<sup>33</sup>
- 4,995 (19.3%) prohibited due to mental health prohibitions
- 4,259 (16.4%) prohibited due to restraining orders
- 2,527 (9.8%) prohibited due to a qualifying misdemeanor conviction
- 495 (1.9%) prohibited due to terms of their probation
- 227(<1%) prohibited due to a felony warrant
- 92 (<1%) prohibited due to misdemeanor warrants
- 9 (<1%) prohibited due to juvenile prohibitions
- 50 (<1%) prohibited due to other reasons<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Note that previous years' reports included incarcerated individuals in these figures.

<sup>33</sup> This category includes individuals who are prohibited under federal law only. It also includes individuals who are subject to both federal and state law firearm prohibitions in circumstances where the federal firearm prohibition outlasts the state firearm prohibition. For example, individuals convicted of certain domestic violence-related misdemeanors prior to 2019 are prohibited from possessing firearms for 10 years after conviction under California law and permanently under federal law.

<sup>34</sup> See Appendix E for a list of Firearm Prohibiting Categories.

Figure 8. Prohibition categories as a percentage of armed prohibited people in APPS as of January 1, 2025<sup>35</sup>



## Case Study


### BOF Removes Firearms from the Residence of a Suicidal Person

In November 2024, the Fresno Police Department (PD) responded to a call for service regarding a person having a mental health crisis. During the call, the caller threatened to commit suicide using his mother’s firearm. Fresno PD contacted BOF after they determined the mother of the suicidal person was prohibited from possessing firearms due to an outstanding felony warrant. BOF obtained a search warrant for the residence of the suicidal subject and his mother. Agents seized one handgun, one rifle, one shotgun and ammunition from the suicidal person’s mother.



35 Many cases have more than one prohibition, which is why these numbers do not equal 100%.

Figure 9. Prohibition categories as a count & percentage of prohibited people, 2020-2024<sup>36</sup>



The number of individuals added to APPS decreased among several categories in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily among felony convictions, mental health prohibitions, and restraining order related prohibitions. In the subsequent three years, felony convictions have remained between 48%-50% of all individuals prohibited in APPS on January 1 of each year, and trends in mental health prohibitions have also been stable. Since 2021, restraining order prohibitions showed the most significant shift, dropping from the post-COVID-19 peak of 20.3% to 16.4% of individuals in APPS on January 1.

### Prohibition Reasons for Newly Prohibited Individuals in 2024

Most of the analyses in the APPS Report that categorize the reason individuals became prohibited present a point-in-time breakdown for individuals who are APPS cases on January 1 of each year. Figure 10 below provides this information for individuals who became newly prohibited APPS subjects at any point during 2024. This includes individuals whose prohibitions began and ended within 2024, who are not captured in the point-in-time data showing individuals actively prohibited on January 1 of each year.<sup>37</sup>


Most notably, 62.5% of the newly prohibited individuals added to APPS in 2024 were prohibited due to a restraining order; this is much higher than the percentage of individuals who were actively prohibited when extracting point-in-time data on January 1 (16.4%). Additionally, only 11.4% of newly prohibited individuals were prohibited due to a felony conviction, which represents a much smaller portion relative to the 48.1% of all currently prohibited APPS subjects when extracting point-in-time data on January 1.

36 Note that percentages of prohibited people by prohibition reason reported in previous years have included incarcerated people. The data reported here updates these breakdowns to only include active and pending cases but not incarcerated individuals. Therefore, percentages reported here may differ from previous reporting years.

37 If an individual had multiple non-overlapping prohibitions that both started and ended in 2024 due to different reasons, those individuals are counted under each relevant prohibition category. These data exclude individuals who were still prohibited in 2024 due to a prohibition that started prior to 2024, instead only capturing individuals who went from nonprohibited to prohibited during 2024.



Figure 10. Reason for Prohibition for Individuals who Became Newly Prohibited APPS Subjects at Any Point During 2024<sup>38</sup>



### Court Protection and Restraining Orders

Individuals prohibited due to court protection and restraining orders represented 16.4% of armed and prohibited persons in APPS on January 1, 2025, but represented nearly two-third (62.5%) of all armed and prohibited individuals who were added to APPS at some point during 2024. (California law generally uses the terms “protection order” and “restraining order” interchangeably). As described above, many court protection and restraining orders remain in effect for a temporary emergency period and expire after just days or weeks. In comparison, a mental health-related adjudication or criminal conviction will often result in much longer-term or permanent firearm prohibitions. As a result, protection and restraining orders comprise a much larger percentage of the individuals who become APPS cases and who are removed from APPS each year.

Of the 4,058 individuals who were removed from APPS in 2024 due to enforcement efforts, 1,261 (31%) were prohibited, at least in part, due to court protection and restraining orders. Of the 5,178 people who had their prohibitions expire in 2024, 3,561 (68.8%) were prohibited, at least in part, due to protection and restraining orders. Similarly, of the 323 people who became deceased in 2024, 6 (1.9 %) were prohibited, at least in part, due to protection and restraining orders.

As noted above, in 2024, 1,261 individuals who were prohibited due to these court restraining orders were removed from the APPS database of armed and prohibited individuals because they were dissociated from all known firearms. However, 3,561 individuals who were prohibited due to restraining orders were removed from the APPS database of armed and prohibited individuals in 2024 because their restraining order expired; these individuals were recorded as being in unlawful possession of firearms throughout the duration of the restraining order. (In many cases, these individuals were subject to emergency or temporary restraining orders that generally expire within 5 to 21 days).<sup>39</sup>

38 Some individuals may become prohibited due to multiple reasons at once. Therefore, a portion of individuals added to APPS during 2024 may be counted in more than one category.

39 Some protection and restraining order cases involving firearms are not included in these counts because they never become APPS cases; this can occur if courts and law enforcement report the firearm prohibition and firearm relinquishment on or around the same day. For example, if a court issues a Gun Violence Restraining Order, and the respondent is immediately notified and immediately relinquishes all known firearms to law enforcement that same day, the court and local law enforcement may report that restraining order to DOJ and simultaneously report that the firearms have already been removed from the individual. Since the person was reported as prohibited but already had their firearms removed, they would not be added to APPS.


Firearm relinquishment requirements can only take effect after the restrained person has been served or notified about the court order. As a result, challenges in serving individuals subject to a restraining order, including when individuals actively evade service, can delay and interfere with efforts to promptly enforce the court order and remove a firearm from a prohibited individual — especially before a very short-term emergency or temporary court restraining order expires. Additionally, in some cases, courts and law enforcement agencies may receive firearm relinquishment verification forms from a prohibited person but fail to promptly or properly update DOJ databases to record that those firearms were in fact relinquished before the expiration of the restraining order. In such cases, an individual’s firearms may have been removed, but the individual would remain identified as illegally armed in APPS for the duration of the order.

As discussed in the Recommendations section, efforts to ensure people subject to restraining orders promptly and safely comply with firearm relinquishment requirements are essential to prevent such individuals from remaining illegally armed. Law enforcement officers can help prevent illegal firearm access by promptly:

- Serving firearm-prohibiting restraining orders;
- Recovering the prohibited person’s firearms at the time of service; and
- Updating DOJ databases to record that service and relinquishment have occurred.

The firearm recovery, combined with the accurate entry into the AFS, will ensure those firearms are immediately disassociated from the prohibited person and that the person is removed from APPS.

*Figure 11. Number of recorded firearm owners who became prohibited due to restraining orders, 2010-2024<sup>40</sup>*



### Number of Agents and Other Staff Hired for Enforcement of the APPS

As of January 1, 2024, DOJ had 76 authorized permanent Special Agent Trainee, Special Agent, Special Agent Supervisor and Special Agent in Charge positions allocated for enforcement of the APPS. Of those positions, 53 were filled and 23 were vacant. By December 2024, DOJ continued to have 76

<sup>40</sup> California law started to require long gun transaction records to be collected, reported, and retained effective January 1, 2014, which may explain a sharp increase in APPS restraining order prohibitions in subsequent years.

authorized permanent positions, of which 56 were filled and 20 were vacant. As Table 2 shows, the number of filled and vacant positions fluctuates throughout the year, reflecting the quick turnover rate of these positions. This illustrates DOJ’s challenges hiring and retaining agents, despite having authorized positions to fill. In an effort to address the ongoing challenges with staffing, specifically recruitment at the Special Agent classification, DOJ has continued recruiting Special Agent Trainees. While this approach may ultimately benefit DOJ by increasing the total number of Special Agents, it can be challenging in the short term due to the time and resources required to educate and train a Special Agent Trainee to perform at the level of a Special Agent.

In December 2023, DOJ had 34 filled Special Agent positions (not including Special Agent Trainees). In 2024, DOJ hired nine Special Agents, one Special Agent Trainee, and two Special Agent Supervisors. Six sworn personnel left DOJ due to inter-departmental transfers and/or promotions, one Special Agent was promoted from within DOJ to Special Agent Supervisor, and one Special Agent Supervisor was promoted from within DOJ to Special Agent-in-Charge. Due to the unique demands placed on APPS team members, Special Agent Trainees are required to meet high standards before promotion to Special Agent. In order to fill positions while maintaining the high standards for training, DOJ temporarily reclassified one Special Agent position to Special Agent Trainee during 2024. Two Special Agent Trainees were promoted in place to Special Agents after successful completion of their training.

A number of enforcement support staff assist Special Agents; these individuals are a significant asset to DOJ. In December 2024, non-sworn enforcement support staff was at a 10% vacancy rate. DOJ is actively recruiting to fill these positions. The fluctuation in Special Agent staffing levels due to transfers and promotions affected the quantity of agents able to initiate and complete enforcement work in 2024.

*Table 2: DOJ authorized positions for the relevant reporting period*

BOF Positions	1/1/2024			6/1/2024			1/1/2025		
	Filled	Vacant	Total Authorized	Filled	Vacant	Total Authorized	Filled	Vacant	Total Authorized
Special Agent	34	20	54	37	17	54	42	12	54
Special Agent Supervisor	13	2	15	12	3	15	11	4	15
Special Agent-in-Charge	2	1	3	2	1	3	2	1	3
Special Agent Trainee	4	0	4	4	0	4	3	1	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>76</b>

DOJ expects it will continue to face challenges in recruiting Special Agents as long as its compensation is not competitive with compensation packages offered by other LEAs. To further aggravate this situation, the state Office of Human Resources has removed the possibility of Agents receiving a Hire Above the Minimum for agents coming on board with extraordinary training, education, and experience.

While recent pay increases have been a step in the right direction, Special Agent monthly base salary at DOJ continues to lag behind comparable positions at other LEAs. In comparison, California law has established a process for ensuring that salaries for sworn personnel at another state law enforcement agency match the average salary of other large law enforcement agencies “in order to recruit and retain the highest qualified employees”.<sup>41</sup> Efforts to promote similar pay parity for DOJ sworn personnel would help DOJ improve recruitment and retention of its highly qualified employees.

Although DOJ only had four retirements of sworn personnel in 2024, it expects in forthcoming years the Division of Law Enforcement (which includes BOF) will face a substantial staffing shortfall because of projected retirements (see Table 3).

*Table 3: Projection of retirement eligibility within the Division of Law Enforcement<sup>42</sup>*

Division of Law Enforcement - SA/SAS/SAC Retirement Eligible Counts			
Fiscal Year	Classification	Employees Eligible to Retire	Cumulative Fiscal Year Total
24-25	Special Agent	38	69
	Special Agent Supervisor	22	
	Special Agent in Charge	9	
25-26	Special Agent	43	80
	Special Agent Supervisor	27	
	Special Agent in Charge	10	
26-27	Special Agent	50	93
	Special Agent Supervisor	30	
	Special Agent in Charge	13	
27-28	Special Agent	52	100
	Special Agent Supervisor	33	
	Special Agent in Charge	15	
28-29	Special Agent	57	109
	Special Agent Supervisor	37	
	Special Agent in Charge	15	
29-30	Special Agent	61	115
	Special Agent Supervisor	38	
	Special Agent in Charge	16	
30-31	Special Agent	69	125
	Special Agent Supervisor	40	
	Special Agent in Charge	16	

<sup>41</sup> See California Government Code Section 19827.

<sup>42</sup> The data in Table 3 was provided on January 14, 2025, by DOJ’s Office of Human Resources Data Analytics Unit and is based on vacancies and headcounts as of January 14, 2025. The projected cumulative fiscal year totals increase each year as additional employees become retirement eligible, and the projection assumes the prior years’ employees have not yet retired.

DOJ had 42 Special Agents, 11 Special Agent Supervisors and two Special Agents-in-Charge, as of January 1, 2025.

Until salaries are increased to competitive levels, either through additional amendments to bargaining unit contracts or by way of another change, as requested in the “Recommendations” section, DOJ can expect to continue to face challenges recruiting agents to fill DOJ’s authorized positions.

### **Number of Contacts Made During APPS Enforcement Efforts**

DOJ’s agents and Crime Analysts are continuously working to research and develop viable APPS investigations to determine which leads will potentially provide the greatest possible number of positive results. Cases are pursued until all investigative leads are exhausted. Individuals are then either: (1) disassociated from all of their firearms and removed from the APPS database; or (2) moved to the Pending category due to the existence of no further leads and are labeled “unable to clear.”

During the course of an investigation, BOF agents may need to make repeated contacts with a prohibited individual to close a case. These repeated contacts occur because the APPS individual may not be home at the time of the initial contact; have moved and failed to update their address with the DMV; have moved out of state; claim the firearm(s) was already seized by local law enforcement or has been reported as lost or stolen; be uncooperative and unforthcoming with information about the firearm(s), requiring further interviews and contacts; or claim to have given their firearm(s) to another person outside of the legal firearms transfer process, requiring agents to track down the firearm(s) and/or verify the provided information.


In total, agents made approximately 25,500 contacts in 2024, the same number of contacts made in 2023. With an average of 35 Special Agents (not including supervisors or agents in training) employed during 2024, which represents an average of 61 contacts per month per agent.<sup>43</sup> Overall, the average number of contacts each agent made per month in 2024 was slightly higher compared to 2023. As in previous years, agents required an average of three separate contacts, including in-person interviews, to close one APPS case. DOJ made the same number of contacts and closed the around the same number of investigations in 2024 compared to 2023.

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<sup>43</sup> DOJ provides this number to illustrate the workload for each agent and compare year-to-year contacts per agent. However, agents always work in teams and will never contact a person in the Armed and Prohibited Persons System alone.



Figure 12. Number of APPS investigations closed annually 2020-2024, and the approximate number of APPS contacts<sup>44</sup>



Special Agent Supervisors are not included in these calculations because, although supervisors are involved in all field operations, their work focuses on being vigilant and available to make quick decisions for the safety of the team. Agents in training are likewise not included in these calculations because they accompany special agents during investigations. Over the course of an investigation, special agents take the lead on investigations and contacts. Supervisors ensure their teams adhere to DOJ policy, follow officer safety protocols, and use proper investigative methods so that no violations of constitutional rights occur during the investigation.

### Number of Firearms Recovered

In 2024, DOJ’s Special Agents seized a total of 1,520 firearms. Of these firearms 881 (58%) were firearms listed in APPS, and 639 (42%) were firearms not listed in the system (non-APPS). See Figures 13 and 14 for a breakdown of the type of APPS and non-APPS firearms recovered. DOJ agents closed 8,501 APPS investigations due to enforcement efforts in 2024.<sup>45</sup> This number does not reflect the number of times DOJ agents attempted to locate an APPS individual or were required to visit third-party residences; it only captures the total number of closed cases.<sup>46</sup> The following graphs detail the number of firearms seized due to APPS enforcement in 2024, categorized by the type of firearms seized.

44 The 2021 APPS report and prior reports included the number of contacts made during non-APPS investigations in addition to APPS specific investigations. This figure in years 2020, 2022, 2023 and 2024, are specific to APPS only investigations for each year.

45 Not all cases closed are removed from APPS. They may remain in the Pending category.

46 Cases can also be closed when 1) agents or criminal analysts find the individual is deceased, 2) the individual has moved out of state and out of DOJ’s jurisdiction, 3) a criminal analyst corrects a data discrepancy, and the individual is cleared.

Figure 13. APPS firearms seized in 2024




Figure 14. Non-APPS firearms seized in 2024




Figure 15. APPS & Non-APPS common firearm seizures by DOJ APPS Agents by Type of Firearm, 2020-2024





Figure 16. APPS vs. Non-APPS firearm seizures by APPS Agents by Year, 2020-2024



### Number of Ghost Guns Recovered


Ghost guns are unserialized — and thus untraceable — firearms assembled or manufactured by individuals who do not have a valid license to manufacture firearms, which means they are generally not recorded in DOJ systems indicating legal firearm acquisition and ownership. By definition, ghost guns do not appear in the APPS database and their sale history generally cannot be tracked by law enforcement. DOJ’s agents seized a total of 39 ghost guns in 2024, a 56% decrease compared to the 88

ghost guns seized during 2023 APPS investigations. This is consistent with decreases in the number of ghost guns recovered from suspected criminal activity statewide in recent years, reflecting progress in California’s efforts to address the proliferation of ghost guns in crime.

California law requires law enforcement agencies to report information to DOJ regarding crime guns recovered by the agency from suspected criminal activity, including firearms that were illegally possessed, used in a crime, or suspected to have been used in a crime. DOJ’s analysis of these crime gun reports documented an enormous increase in the number of unserialized ghost guns recovered as crime guns by law enforcement agencies across California between 2015 and 2021, and then substantial decreases in recent years following California’s comprehensive legislative, litigation, and enforcement responses. DOJ is actively working with law enforcement partners to establish collaborative investigative efforts aimed at addressing ghost gun activity and continues to investigate the illegal manufacturing and possession of ghost guns.

For more information about ghost guns and DOJ’s actions to stop the proliferation of ghost guns in crime, see the DOJ Office of Gun Violence Prevention’s October 2024 Report, “California’s Fight Against the Ghost Gun Crisis: Progress and New Challenges.”<sup>47</sup>

Figure 17. Trends in ghost gun seizures by DOJ APPS Agents, 2020-2024



### Ammunition Recovered

In 2024, DOJ agents recovered 371 large-capacity magazines, 2,151 standard-capacity magazines, and 1,322,997 rounds of ammunition.

### Ammunition Purchase Eligibility Check Program

Proposition 63 (The Safety for All Act), as amended by Senate Bill 1235 (SB 1235) (Stats. 2016, ch. 55), was approved by voters in 2016. The intent of Proposition 63 and SB 1235 was primarily to keep prohibited persons from acquiring ammunition in an effort to prevent gun violence. Under the new laws, ammunition must be purchased from or transferred by a licensed California Ammunition Vendor in a face-to-face transaction. Effective July 1, 2019, the law required California Ammunition Vendors to submit eligibility checks for prospective purchasers to DOJ and obtain approval prior to selling or transferring ammunition. Thereafter, California Ammunition Vendors are required to submit

47 Available at [www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ogvp-report-ghost-guns.pdf](http://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ogvp-report-ghost-guns.pdf)

ammunition purchase details to DOJ. The eligibility checks ensure purchasers are not prohibited from owning or possessing firearms or ammunition.

On July 1, 2019, DOJ successfully deployed enhancements to the Dealer Record of Sale (DROS) Entry System, which allowed California Ammunition Vendors to submit eligibility checks, and subsequently report ammunition purchases in compliance with Proposition 63.

Monitoring denied ammunition purchases is an effective strategy because the attempted ammunition purchases signal to DOJ agents that a prohibited person still possesses and may be actively using a firearm. Additionally, it often provides more current addresses than those previously available in the APPS database. While the use of ammunition denial data is ancillary to regular APPS investigations, nearly every investigation results in a seizure of firearms and/or ammunition from a prohibited person.

In 2024, DOJ received reports of 191 armed and prohibited individuals who attempted to purchase ammunition and were denied through the ammunition eligibility check process. DOJ agents used the intelligence gathered through the ammunition purchase denials to investigate 191 individuals and close 115 of these cases. These investigations resulted in the seizure of 44 APPS firearms (26 handguns, 12 rifles, one receiver/frame, and five shotguns), eight non-APPS firearms (three handguns, four rifles and one shotgun), 70 standard magazines, and 8,712 rounds of ammunition. The remainder of the denial cases are under investigation. All seizures resulting from these ammunition purchase eligibility check denials are included in the overall APPS statistics provided in the “number of firearms recovered” section of this report.

Effective January 1, 2023, new legislation also directed DOJ to notify local law enforcement agencies when a prohibited person in their community attempts to purchase or acquire ammunition and fails an ammunition eligibility check.<sup>48</sup> These notifications may provide local law enforcement with information to initiate an investigation regarding whether the prohibited person is attempting to purchase ammunition for an unlawfully possessed firearm.

## **Task Forces and Collaboration with Law Enforcement**

As discussed in the “Recommendations” section, DOJ would like to expand APPS enforcement efforts through the implementation and administration of additional regional task forces. Currently, DOJ does not have adequate funding to staff and oversee additional task forces. Task forces are a force multiplier, enabling a more proactive and coordinated approach to removing firearms from prohibited persons. DOJ provides resources, experience, and expertise to state and federal law enforcement, as well as to local law enforcement, who are now tasked with implementing and reporting their own firearm relinquishment efforts. By centralizing efforts through task forces, agencies can improve information-sharing, enhance enforcement operations, and streamline investigations to more quickly and effectively locate prohibited persons and seize their firearms.

### **Tulare County Agencies Regional Gun Violence Enforcement Team**

In December 2020, DOJ assumed management of the Tulare County Agencies Regional Gun Violence Enforcement Team, also known as the TARGET Task Force. Due to funding issues, management of this task force was redirected from DOJ’s Bureau of Investigation to its BOF. The primary mission of the TARGET Task Force is to investigate crimes involving gun violence and to seize firearms from prohibited individuals in the Tulare County region. Through this task force, DOJ has increased collaborative efforts and support of local and state law enforcement in the region. This task force consists of representatives from the following agencies:

- California DOJ, Bureau of Firearms
- Tulare County Sheriff’s Department

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<sup>48</sup> See Assembly Bill (AB) 2551 (Stats. 2022, ch. 100).



- Visalia Police Department
- U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

In 2024, the TARGET Task Force conducted 200 firearms-related investigations, of which 130 were APPS investigations. During these investigations, they conducted 21 probation/parole searches and executed 39 search warrants. As a result of these investigations, the TARGET Task Force arrested 23 armed individuals for firearms-related offenses and seized 125 firearms, including 54 APPS firearms (two assault weapons, 35 handguns, 12 rifles, and five shotguns). The seizure of these 54 APPS firearms is reported within the overall APPS statistics.

The 71 firearms seized during non-APPS investigations are not included in seizure totals for this report. Because not all firearms crimes in any county are committed by people in the APPS database, this task force focuses on investigating a broad range of subjects involved in firearms-related crimes — including those in the APPS database. Like the CASE Task Force, the TARGET Task Force represents an efficient and effective model for collaboration with local, state, and federal LEAs on both APPS and non-APPS firearms investigations and affords a proactive approach to combating firearm violence.

### **Contra Costa County Anti-Violence Support Effort Task Force**

DOJ currently manages the Contra Costa County Anti-Violence Support Effort (CASE) Task Force. The primary mission of the CASE Task Force is to conduct complex firearms investigations and to seize firearms from prohibited and violent individuals in the Bay Area. This task force consists of representatives from the following agencies:

- California DOJ, Bureau of Firearms
- Contra Costa County Probation Department
- Hercules Police Department
- Oakley Police Department
- California Highway Patrol
- U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

The CASE Task Force is a stand-alone task force dedicated to reducing firearm related crimes, identifying and apprehending prohibited persons, and assisting LEAs with specific firearm and crime related investigations.

In 2024, the CASE Task Force conducted 29 firearms-related investigations, of which one was APPS-related. During these investigations, it conducted 20 probation or parole searches and executed 10 search warrants. As a result of these investigations, the CASE Task Force arrested 10 armed individuals for firearms-related offenses and seized 342 firearms, including 28 APPS firearms (27 handguns, one shotgun). The seizure of these 28 APPS firearms are reported with the overall APPS statistics. The remaining 314 firearms seized during non-APPS investigations are not included in seizure totals for this report. Because not all firearms crimes in any county are committed by people in the APPS database, this task force focuses on investigating a broad range of subjects involved in firearms-related crimes — including those in the APPS database. As discussed more thoroughly in the recommendations section, additional funding for task forces like CASE would increase the number of APPS cases they could investigate.

## **Ventura County Sheriff's Office Gun Violence Reduction Program (Task Force)**

In August of 2024, the BOF signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ventura County Sheriff's Office to participate in the Ventura County Gun Violence Reduction Program (GVRP) Task Force, and work together to remove firearms from prohibited persons, seize unlawful firearms, and reduce the number of individuals within Ventura County that are prohibited in APPS. This task force consists of the representatives from the following agencies:

- Ventura County Sheriff's Office
- Ventura County District Attorney's Office
- California DOJ, Bureau of Firearms

Since August 2024, the Ventura GVRP Task Force conducted 74 firearms-related investigations, of which 56 were APPS related. During these investigations, the Task Force conducted two probation or parole searches and executed one search warrant. As a result of these investigations, the GVRP Task Force arrested five armed individuals for firearms-related offenses and seized 164 firearms, including 59 APPS firearms (19 handguns, 14 rifles, 24 shotguns, and two assault weapons). The seizure of the 59 APPS firearms was reported with the overall APPS statistics. The remaining 105 firearms seized during non-APPS investigations are not included in seizure totals for this report. Because not all firearm crimes in any county are committed by people in the APPS database, this task force focuses on investigating a broad range of subjects involved in firearms-related crimes — including those in the APPS database. As discussed more thoroughly in the recommendations section, additional funding for task forces like CASE, TARGET and the Ventura GVRP, would increase the number of APPS cases they could investigate.

### **Joint Sweep Investigations**

In addition to participating in the three task forces described above, DOJ also conducts collaborative APPS sweeps throughout the state upon request of a local or county LEA. These sweeps consist of BOF personnel working together with allied LEAs in a certain jurisdiction of the state for a period of multiple days conducting APPS investigations. DOJ conducted two regional sweeps in 2024: one statewide sweep and one regional sweep focused on Yolo County.

During these regional sweeps, Special Agents collaborated with local LEAs in a partnership to safely conduct APPS investigations. Although many LEAs were unable to participate in the sweeps due to staffing issues, DOJ still received assistance from multiple agencies throughout the state. Local patrol officers can act as a force multiplier to benefit APPS enforcement by providing additional information regarding the location of APPS subjects and can assist with marked patrol vehicles. Local officers can also help expedite the transport and booking process of arrested subjects due to their familiarity with individual county processes. If the subject reports a missing or stolen firearm, the local law enforcement agency can work with the subject to promptly report that information into the Automated Firearms System (AFS) database, which may result in the removal of the subject from the APPS database.

These sweeps increased APPS investigations while strengthening partnerships with local LEAs throughout California.

In 2024, BOF conducted both a statewide sweep and a regional sweep focused on Yolo County. As a result of these sweeps, BOF cumulatively investigated 634 cases, which included five assault weapon seizures and 116 firearm seizures. The 116 firearm seizures included 84 APPS firearms, 32 non-APPS firearms, 103 magazines, 29 large capacity magazines, and 37,490 rounds of ammunition. BOF worked jointly with the following agencies during the sweeps in 2024:

- Orange County Sheriff’s Office
- Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department
- Los Angeles County Probation Department
- Marin County Sheriff’s Office
- Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office
- Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office.
- Yolo County District Attorney’s Office

Over the past year, BOF significantly increased collaboration with local law enforcement agencies on APPS investigations. In addition to the agencies BOF worked with during the statewide sweep, BOF also worked jointly with the following agencies on APPS investigations throughout the year:

- Menifee Police Department
- San Diego County Sheriff’s Office
- Ventura County District Attorney’s Office
- Monterey Park Police Department
- Pomona Police Department
- Glendora Police Department
- San Bernardino Police Department

Looking ahead, DOJ expects to foster more partnerships for collaborative sweeps in 2025.

## **Gun Violence Reduction Program**

Assembly Bill (AB) 74 provided grant funding to the Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC) for statewide Gun Violence Prevention Programs. In 2019, funds were disbursed by the BSCC to four counties, Alameda, San Diego, Santa Cruz and Ventura, to investigate and close APPS cases. Owing to its success, the Legislature temporarily expanded the scope of the Gun Violence Reduction Pilot Program (GVRPP) by creating the DOJ Gun Violence Reduction Program (GVRP) grant through the 2021 Budget Act, Senate Bill (SB) 129.

SB 129 allocated \$10.3 million for two years for the GVRP grant “to support county sheriff’s departments conducting activities related to the seizure of weapons and ammunition from persons who are prohibited from possessing them, including efforts based upon entries in the Department of Justice’s Armed Prohibited Persons System (APPS).” Unlike the GVRPP, which was operated by the BSCC, the GVRP is operated by DOJ. Under the program, DOJ awarded grants to county sheriff’s departments to support seizures of firearms and ammunition from prohibited individuals. This program was designed to increase collaboration with local law enforcement across the state to enhance public safety by removing firearms and ammunition from prohibited persons. Collaboration between DOJ and local LEAs has proven to be a successful model which streamlines APPS enforcement efficiencies.

Pursuant to SB 129, DOJ made \$10 million available over two grant cycles. Approximately \$5 million was awarded by January 1, 2022, and nearly \$3 million was awarded by January 1, 2023. Following the grant criteria outlined in SB 129, grant applicants were asked to provide clearly defined and measurable objectives for closing APPS cases and reducing the number of prohibited persons in possession of firearms. The sheriff's departments were also required to explain how the grants would enhance existing law enforcement activities and also how the funds would be used for new activities, including innovative techniques and approaches toward APPS enforcement.

Pursuant to the parameters for grantee selection outlined in SB 129, DOJ prioritized counties with the highest per capita population of armed and prohibited persons that also lacked a DOJ field office. Grant priority was also given to departments that proposed innovative techniques and approaches to APPS enforcement, integrated APPS enforcement into existing operations, and presented a plan with the greatest likelihood of success.

In the first grant cycle, 10 county sheriff's departments were awarded grants to support activities related but not limited to seizing firearms and ammunition from individuals prohibited from owning or possessing them, collaborating with courts and District Attorney Offices to immediately seize firearms at the time of prohibition, and training law enforcement officers. The sheriff's departments and offices of Contra Costa, Lake, Los Angeles, Orange, Sacramento, San Francisco, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, and Ventura counties received grant funding through the first cycle of DOJ's GVRP. The second grant cycle included the sheriff's departments and offices of Kings, Lassen, San Joaquin, Stanislaus, and Ventura counties.

Below is data from the grantees awarded 2022-2023 second cycle grants. Second cycle grantees have provided 2024 data, but the GVRP ended as of December 31, 2024. As such, this will be the last year data is reported.

The grantees listed below reported statistical information regarding the enforcement of this grant funding to DOJ by February 1, 2025. The statistical information demonstrated that most counties worked APPS cases throughout the year and provided DOJ with adequate data to analyze their progress during 2024. The requested statistical information included the number of individual cases investigated, the outcome of those investigations, and the number of prohibited APPS individuals before and after the reporting period.

DOJ then cross-referenced records provided by the grantee counties to data within the APPS database to verify that the county's reported cases exist in DOJ's APPS database. In some instances, records could not be verified because the grantee provided different identifying information than what is in the APPS database. These remain on the active list until DOJ or an LEA can conduct further investigations, or records are reconciled. In the meantime, only verified cases are included in GVRP analyses in this report. The results reported below detail the records DOJ could find and their status as of January 1, 2025.

### ***Kings County Sheriff's Office***

The Kings County Sheriff's Office received \$355,686 in GVRP funding and reported working on 152 cases. DOJ verified 91 of the cases in APPS. As of January 1, 2025, eight of these 91 cases were disassociated from all firearms, seven are no longer prohibited from possessing a firearm, 25 cases remain Active in APPS, and 51 cases are labelled as Pending. Of the Pending cases, nine are incarcerated, four are prohibited due to a Federal Brady Prohibition only, 31 are unable to be cleared from APPS, and six subjects have not been located. Additionally, 18 additional subjects were not prohibited in APPS during the reporting period.

### ***San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office***

The San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office received \$987,072 in GVRP funding and reported working on 1,026 cases; DOJ was able to verify 1,025 of these cases. As of January 1, 2025, 983 cases could be broken down as follows: 144 subjects were disassociated from all firearms, 167 subjects had prohibitions that expired in 2024, and 16 were deceased. Additionally, 287 cases remained Active, and 369 were Pending in APPS by the end of the reporting period. The 369 Pending cases included 72 subjects that were unable to be located, 196 that were unable to be cleared, 52 that were prohibited due to a Federal Brady prohibition only, eight cases that were out of state, and 41 subjects who were incarcerated. The remaining 42 subjects were not prohibited in APPS during the reporting period.

### ***Stanislaus County Sheriff's Department***

The Stanislaus County Sheriff's Department received \$568,604 in GVRP funding and reported working on 63 cases. As of January 1, 2025, DOJ verified 37 of these cases in APPS. Of these cases, five were disassociated from all firearms, five had prohibitions that expired in 2024, and one was deceased. Additionally, seven cases remained active and 19 were Pending, including eleven that were unable to be cleared, five that were unable to be located, and three that were subject to a Federal Brady prohibition. Additionally, 25 additional subjects were not prohibited in APPS during the reporting period.

### ***Ventura County Sheriff's Office***

The Ventura County Sheriff's Office received GVRP funding in both 2022 and 2023, totaling \$652,575 and \$555,876 respectively, and reported working on 142 cases. DOJ verified 129 of these cases. These included 44 subjects that were disassociated from all firearms, 56 whose prohibitions expired, and three who were deceased. Additionally, 12 cases remained Active and 14 were Pending including one where the subject was unable to be located, six that moved out of state, four that could not be cleared, two that were incarcerated, and one prohibited under a Federal Brady prohibition. The remaining 13 subjects reported were identified as not prohibited in APPS, having prohibitions prior to 2024, or having been removed from APPS prior to 2024.

### **Firearms & Removal Reporting**

While most counties provided clear records on individuals investigated throughout the year, the firearm data and final status of some individuals showed discrepancies between the information counties reported and information in DOJ's records. Some counties reported firearms as being "cleared" or "recovered," and individuals as being "suspended" or "removed" from APPS, but DOJ's data contradicted these reports.

For more detailed information on GVRP awards and program summaries, see Appendix H.



## **APPS Report Detailed Recommendations**

DOJ greatly appreciates Governor Gavin Newsom’s and the Legislature’s interest in sensible firearms regulation and enforcement, and additional financial support toward these efforts. In particular, recent years have seen an influx of legislation resulting from and attention directed to the recommendations in previous APPS Reports; DOJ is grateful that these recommendations are being heeded. As noted throughout this report, the recommendations below would improve survivor and public safety, help DOJ to report the information mandated under Penal Code section 30012 and would also improve the efficiency and efficacy of the APPS program and related gun violence prevention efforts. To that end, DOJ recommends the following:

- 1) Promote Consistent Firearm Relinquishment at the Time of Conviction:** Permanently fund the mandate that courts, through probation departments, and law enforcement agencies ensure the relinquishment of all firearms from criminal defendants prior to final sentencing when an individual becomes prohibited due to a felony or qualifying misdemeanor conviction.<sup>49</sup> This is the best opportunity to ensure that firearms are effectively and safely removed from prohibited criminal defendants.

Pursuant to Proposition 63 (2016), California has enacted clear, mandatory processes and timelines for people convicted of firearm-prohibiting crimes to verify that they relinquished all firearms in their possession. Penal Code section 29810, initially added to the Penal Code by Proposition 63, also provides clear mandates for courts and probation departments to ensure that people convicted of such crimes do not remain illegally armed.

When a defendant is convicted of a firearm-prohibiting crime, courts must provide a standard Prohibited Persons Relinquishment Form to the defendant to facilitate relinquishment of all firearms through a designated third-party or law enforcement agency. Courts must immediately assign the matter to a probation officer who is responsible for determining whether the defendant possessed firearms — including those recorded in DOJ databases and others identified in police reports or other sources — and if so, whether the defendant lawfully relinquished all firearms. The probation officer coordinates with the defendant or the defendant’s designee to receive receipts verifying that all firearms were relinquished and must generally report to the court prior to final sentencing in the case regarding whether the defendant lawfully complied with these requirements. The probation officer must also report specified information to DOJ to ensure relevant record systems are updated.

These mandates place significant requirements on courts and probation departments, which may often lack the necessary resources to ensure compliance at the time of conviction. As a result, despite these clear requirements and processes, many individuals found guilty of a prohibiting crime continue to illegally own guns after their conviction; about 60% of armed prohibited persons in APPS as of January 1, 2025, were prohibited due to a criminal conviction.

In 2023, California enacted DOJ-sponsored legislation, AB 732 (M. Fong), effective January 1, 2024, to promote post-conviction relinquishment efforts. AB 732 strengthened these processes by requiring the assigned probation officer to share the firearm relinquishment report with the prosecuting attorney, as well as courts, and by requiring courts to take specified steps to recover illegally retained firearms if the probation officer report does not confirm firearm relinquishment compliance, including by issuing a warrant in appropriate circumstances to order the search for and removal of the defendant’s weapons. AB 732 also helps to ensure that local law enforcement agencies and district attorneys have access through an electronic DOJ portal to information about armed and prohibited persons in their jurisdiction and requires local law

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<sup>49</sup> See Cal. Penal Code section 29810.

enforcement agencies to designate personnel responsible for accessing this information and reporting to DOJ quarterly regarding efforts to recover illegally possessed firearms, including from people who are prohibited due to a criminal conviction.

Additional resources, training, and coordination for courts, probation departments, and local law enforcement to implement and enforce these requirements and related compliance efforts would help reduce the number of people who remain illegally armed after a criminal conviction.

- 2) Promote Consistent Firearm Relinquishment at the Time a Restraining Order Issues:** Develop and fund a statewide, county-level firearm relinquishment system with designated personnel responsible for coordinating firearm relinquishment efforts and promoting more consistent service and enforcement of firearm-prohibiting restraining orders and other court orders.

California has enacted clear, mandatory processes and timelines for people who become subject to court restraining orders to verify that they relinquished all firearms in their possession. However, there are some unique challenges in the restraining order context. As noted above, in the context of a criminal conviction, California law places responsibilities on assigned probation officers to play a critical coordinating role; they work to identify armed and prohibited defendants, provide them with relevant information, and report to courts and law enforcement authorities if the prohibited person unlawfully fails to relinquish their weapons.

In the context of most court restraining orders, however, there is often no one with similar designated responsibilities to coordinate firearm relinquishment efforts. A lack of accessible county-level data and information about people subject to court restraining orders has at times impeded local stakeholders' ability to identify non-compliance and act at the local level.

The Legislature has recently taken multiple steps to help support more proactive and consistent local efforts to serve and enforce firearm-prohibiting court restraining orders, including:

- In the 2022 Budget Act, the Legislature allocated \$40,000,000 to the Judicial Council to establish and fund a new Firearm Relinquishment Grant Program.<sup>50</sup> This program funds partnerships between county superior courts and local law enforcement agency partners to “ensure the consistent and safe removal of firearms from individuals who become prohibited from owning or possessing firearms and ammunition pursuant to court order.” This grant program provides funding for courts and law enforcement agencies to develop standard local firearm relinquishment processes, employ designated firearm relinquishment coordinators, and improve data and communications, including service and enforcement of restraining orders.
- In 2023, the Legislature also enacted AB 28 (Gabriel), The Gun Violence Prevention and School Safety Act, which will, after July 1, 2025, and upon appropriation by the Legislature, provide up to \$15,000,000 annually for the Judicial Council to fund an expanded Firearm Relinquishment Grant Program, to be administered in coordination with DOJ. AB 28 specifies that these grants shall be “designed to reduce the number of people who are entered into or remain in the Armed Prohibited Persons System, including by supporting partnerships with courts and local law enforcement agencies,” for the purpose of ensuring the prompt, consistent, and safe removal of firearms from individuals who become prohibited pursuant to either a criminal conviction, court restraining order, or other court order. This legislation provides a *potential* source for ongoing future funding to sustain and replicate best practices

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50 In 2024, \$9.2 million reverted back to the General Fund to address statewide budget deficits, leaving a total of \$30.8 million for this grant program allocated over three cycles in February 2023, July 2023, and December 2024. See Judicial Council of California, “Report on the Firearms Relinquishment Grant Program for 2023-2024” (Sept. 30, 2024), at [lr-2024-allocation-of-funding-fy-2023-24-court-based-firearm-relinquishment-program.pdf](#).

developed by new grantees implementing firearm relinquishment coordinating programs; however, according to early revenue projections included in the Governor's January 2025 Budget Summary, there would likely not be sufficient revenue in the Gun Violence Prevention and School Safety Special Fund to make any funding allocations to the Firearm Relinquishment Grant Program in the 2024-25 or 2025-26 budget years.

- As noted above, in 2023, the Legislature also enacted DOJ-sponsored AB 732 (M. Fong) to ensure that local law enforcement agencies and district attorneys have access through an electronic portal to information about armed and prohibited persons in their jurisdiction. This law also requires law enforcement agencies to designate specific personnel responsible for accessing this information and reporting to DOJ regarding efforts by that agency to recover firearms from armed and prohibited people in their jurisdiction.
- In 2023, the Legislature also enacted AB 818 (Petrie-Norris), which expands the requirement for law enforcement officers to serve domestic violence restraining orders upon request by the petitioner. This law also clarifies that law enforcement officers must take temporary custody of firearms in plain sight or discovered pursuant to a lawful search when at the scene of certain domestic violence incidents or when serving domestic violence or gun violence restraining orders, and requires that officers report information to DOJ about firearms obtained at the scene of a domestic violence incident or during service of certain restraining orders.
- In 2024, the Legislature enacted DOJ-endorsed SB 899 (Skinner), which takes effect January 1, 2026, and codifies stronger process requirements for courts and local law enforcement to promote more consistent service, implementation, and enforcement of all types of protection and restraining orders that include firearm restrictions; this law extends requirements that are already in effect for Domestic Violence Restraining Orders (DVROs) to other types of protection and restraining orders that require the respondent to relinquish firearms for the duration of the order. The Legislature also enacted AB 2907 (Zbur) to extend similar provisions from SB 899 to certain criminal court protective orders, and enacted AB 3083 (Lackey) requiring courts, prior to a hearing on a request for a DVRO, to check information maintained in DOJ's Automated Firearms System to determine whether the respondent is identified as owning or possessing firearms in DOJ's records. This provision is designed to ensure that courts can more proactively ensure that DVRO respondents who already possess firearms promptly relinquish those weapons.

Together, these efforts reflect the Legislature's commitment to strengthening and investing in processes to ensure that firearm-prohibiting restraining orders are more consistently served, implemented, and enforced.

More coordinated county-level firearm relinquishment programs could build on these efforts by designating personnel responsible for coordinating local firearm relinquishment efforts and developing standard processes and record systems to identify non-compliance and ensure firearms are removed from prohibited persons who pose a threat to their communities. Additionally, a coordinated county-level firearm relinquishment system could also help ensure that firearm seizures are consistently documented in the Automated Firearms System (AFS). These entries into AFS would prevent unnecessary, duplicative efforts by DOJ and potentially other agencies.

A large majority of armed and prohibited individuals added to APPS in 2024 were prohibited due to restraining orders. Over 3,000 armed individuals subject to prohibiting restraining orders were removed from APPS during 2024 solely because their restraining order expired,

indicating that they were recorded as illegally possessing firearms for the duration of the order. If local LEAs could more consistently facilitate relinquishment and recover firearms from restrained individuals immediately upon service of the various types of restraining orders, it could significantly reduce the number of individuals who become illegally armed each year and ensure that court protection and restraining orders provide meaningful protection to survivors of violence and abuse as soon as possible.

- 3) Prioritize the Recruitment of Special Agents by Making Salaries Competitive with Other LEAs.** Traditionally, proof of graduation from a police academy training program constitutes the main requirement for applicants seeking positions in law enforcement. However, DOJ's Special Agent requirements are significantly more rigorous. In addition to graduating from a police academy, Special Agents are required to have at least one year of experience as a peace officer and, in many cases<sup>51</sup>, have attended or graduated from college. However, entry-level Special Agents are paid less than those in LEAs that do not have these same requirements.

While recent pay increases have moved DOJ Special Agent salaries into a more competitive position, monthly base pay continues to lag behind comparable positions at other LEAs. Seizing firearms from prohibited persons is dangerous and difficult work that requires quick decision-making and superior analytical thinking. To recruit and maintain the caliber of individuals necessary to perform this work, BOF must be able to offer competitive pay. Moreover, the agents who do this work should be competitively compensated for their efforts. DOJ has moved to a more aggressive hiring model in an attempt at filling Special Agent and Special Agent Supervisor positions at a quicker rate and keep pace with agent attrition. However, receiving additional funding and contracting for salary increases would greatly improve recruitment of agents for DOJ's currently authorized positions.

As noted above, California law has established a process for ensuring that salaries for sworn personnel at another state law enforcement agency match the average salary of other large law enforcement agencies "in order to recruit and retain the highest qualified employees."<sup>52</sup> Efforts to promote similar pay parity for DOJ sworn personnel would help DOJ improve recruitment and retention of its highly qualified employees, allowing more fully staffed DOJ APPS enforcement teams to investigate and close more APPS cases and recover more illegal firearms.

- 4) Modernize the Existing Firearms Databases.** Automate many of the manual processes to improve overall efficiency, risk mitigation, and stabilization of employee resources. As communicated to the DOF when the Legislature implemented SB 94's current reporting requirements under Penal Code section 30012, DOJ cannot fulfill this obligation until it modernizes the firearms databases.

The following systems support the regulation, and enforcement actions relating to the manufacture, sale, ownership, safety training, and transfer of firearms.

- Ammo Processor
- Armed and Prohibited Persons System (APPS)
- Automated Firearms System (AFS)
- California Firearms Information Gateway (CFIG)
- California Firearms Licensee Check (CFLC)
- Carry Concealed Weapons (CCW)
- Centralized List (CL)

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51 Additional qualifying experience may be substituted for the required college education on a year-for-year basis.  
52 See California Government Code Section 19827.

- Consolidated Firearms Information System (CFIS)
- Dealer Record of Sale (DROS)
- DROS Entry System (DES)
- California Firearms Application Reporting System (CFARS)
- Firearms Certificate System (FCS)
- Assault Weapons Registration (AWR)
- Firearms Employment Application File (FEAF)
- Mental Health Reporting System (MHRS)
- Mental Health Firearms Prohibition System (MHFPS)
- Prohibited Applicant (PA)

This network of systems is incredibly complex and cumbersome to operate and navigate.<sup>53</sup> Despite this monumental challenge, DOJ has been able to meet most legislative reporting mandates using these outdated databases. These databases are not flexible and were not designed to be adaptable to meet additional demands. DOJ has been able to partially adapt and circumvent issues despite using technology that is not equipped with automated processes to meet the specified conditions. Consequently, most, if not all queries must be pulled and cross-checked manually from database to database, hindering efficiency and introducing increased opportunities for error. Working to modify or maintain these legacy systems is no longer cost-effective or a technologically viable option as the databases have become outdated and no longer meet the demands of the Legislature and DOJ.

The project team has progressed to Stage 3, the Solution Development phase that covers the procurement activities to select vendors for the solution implementation phase for FITSM. Stage 3 activities include identification of the business and technical requirements for the solution, data analysis, and cleanup processes. DOJ is working to secure funding to complete Stages 3 and 4 and will continue to complete work towards vendor selection and initiating the implementation activities.

- 5) Modernize the CARPOS System:** DOJ maintains the California Restraining and Protective Order System (CARPOS) database, which provides courts and law enforcement agencies with access, through the California Law Enforcement and Telecommunications System (CLETS), to important details about court protection and restraining orders statewide, including their terms and conditions, firearm prohibitions, expiration date, whether the respondent has received notice of the order, and who the order restrains and protects. This information is essential for safeguarding survivors of violence and abuse and informing law enforcement officers in the field. Information reported into the CARPOS database is also used by DOJ’s BOF for firearm and ammunition-related background checks and APPS purposes. However, there are several limitations to this system today.

For instance, courts and law enforcement agencies must manually enter a fairly significant amount of information to report protection order information into CARPOS, which can introduce delays in reporting and enforcement; these delays can be mitigated with appropriate technological and process enhancements.

Courts in protection and restraining order cases may find that a person possesses a firearm such as a ghost gun that is not otherwise captured in DOJ databases; CARPOS does not systematically track information about those firearms or about whether the restrained person has complied

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<sup>53</sup> More details on the challenges of the current firearm database systems are outlined in the “Firearms Information Technology Systems Modernization (FITSM) Project” section on Page 17.

with firearm relinquishment requirements. Enhancements to the system could document information about cases where a court finds the restrained person has a firearm and help identify noncompliance if the restrained person fails to provide proof of relinquishment forms verifying compliance.

Enhancements to the system could also help DOJ more proactively push information from CARPOS out to designated firearm relinquishment partners. Currently, local partners can access information about individual restraining order respondents in their jurisdiction but generally do not have ready access, for example, to city or county-level information such as a list of all unserved restraining orders in their jurisdiction; because firearm relinquishment requirements take effect after a restrained person has been served with notice of the order, delays or challenges in effectuating service can be a major impediment to actually recovering firearms from prohibited people in these cases.

Additional resources and legislative authorization could also enable DOJ to establish an automated protected person information and notification system to provide survivors who obtain protection orders with automated access to information about their own case, including whether DOJ has received any record of their court order or whether the order has been successfully served on, or violated by, the restrained person. This enhancement could help proactively inform survivors about their own case and empower them to take appropriate action for their own safety and in support of accountability and enforcement.

- 6) Harness the Force Multiplier of Local LEA Collaboration:** Further establishing and funding statewide joint task forces with LEAs would be a force multiplier for DOJ that would ensure more thorough coordinated effort to get prohibited guns off the street and ensure that the data in the APPS database is as current as possible.

DOJ's APPS enforcement teams play a vital role and have decades of leadership and expertise in safely removing firearms from illegally armed people. There are few programs like APPS in the country, and it is an important testament to California's commitment to survivors' and public safety. However, the APPS program is not designed or resourced at scale to perform this essential safety work alone; much more proactive, coordinated prioritization of relinquishment compliance at the local level is needed to significantly reduce the number of people who become illegally armed APPS subjects in the first place and to reduce the amount of time before firearms are removed from non-compliant, illegally armed individuals.

In 2023, the Legislature enacted DOJ-sponsored AB 732 (M. Fong) to ensure that local law enforcement agencies and district attorneys have access through an electronic portal to information about armed and prohibited persons in their jurisdiction. This law also requires law enforcement agencies to designate specific personnel responsible for accessing this information and reporting to DOJ regarding efforts by that agency to recover firearms from armed and prohibited people in their jurisdiction.

Since AB 732 took effect in January of 2024, DOJ has seen a significant increase in the interest from local law enforcement agencies to work with DOJ in a collaborative effort to reduce armed and prohibited individuals in their communities. DOJ has also been asked about the feasibility of adding and running regional task forces to support local APPS and gun violence reduction efforts. Funding special agent supervisor positions to oversee regional task forces would help promote those efforts and magnify resources to address APPS and gun violence reduction efforts.





## APPENDICES

### Appendix A: Relevant Key Terms and Definitions

This section provides definitions of key terms used throughout this report.

**Armed and Prohibited Persons System (APPS).** The APPS database, housed at the California Department of Justice (DOJ), which contains a list of all individuals who are both armed (DOJ is aware of their ownership of one or more firearms) and prohibited (for one or more reasons they have been designated as not being permitted to own or possess firearms).

**Automated Criminal History System (ACHS).** The repository for the state summary Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI). In addition, DOJ transmits CORI to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

**Automated Firearms System (AFS).** This system was created in 1980 to identify lost or stolen firearms and connect firearms with persons. The system tracks serial numbers of every firearm owned by government agencies, handled by law enforcement (seized, destroyed, held in evidence, reported stolen, recovered), voluntarily recorded in AFS, or handled by a firearms dealer through transactions. Prior to 2014, most entries in AFS were handguns. Now, all newly acquired firearms, both handguns and long guns, are entered into AFS.

**Backlog.** The number of cases for which DOJ did not initiate an investigation within six months of the case being added to the APPS database or has not completed investigatory work within six months of initiating an investigation on the case.

**Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.** The Federal Brady Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), makes it unlawful for certain categories of persons to ship, transport, receive, or possess firearms or ammunition, to include any person:

- Convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
- Who is a fugitive from justice;
- Who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined in Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 802);
- Who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution;
- Who is an illegal alien;
- Who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions;
- Who has renounced his or her United States citizenship;
- Who is subject to a court order restraining the person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner or child of the intimate partner; or
- Who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 992(n), it is also unlawful for any person under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship, transport, or receive firearms or ammunition. Further, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) makes it unlawful to sell or otherwise dispose of firearms or ammunition to any person who is prohibited from shipping, transporting, receiving, or possessing firearms or ammunition. DOJ refers to these prohibitions as Federal Brady Act prohibitions. Since these individuals are only prohibited due to federal law, DOJ lacks jurisdictional authority to investigate these individuals, unless they also have a California prohibition. On January 1, 2025, there were 25,911 armed and

prohibited persons in the APPS database (10,044 active and 15,867 pending). Of the 15,867 pending cases, 1,719 are Federal Brady only cases.

**California Restraining and Protective Order System (CARPOS).** A statewide database of individuals subject to a restraining order.

**Cleared.** All cases in which the individual has died, the prohibition has expired or been reduced (e.g., the expiration of a temporary restraining order), or the individual has been disassociated from the firearm(s) such as selling, transferring, or turning over their firearm(s).

**Closed.** Any investigation that has been fully investigated and the individual has been cleared from APPS, or all investigative leads are exhausted, and the individual remains in APPS with a pending status (see definition of pending and sub-statuses definitions).

**Consolidated Firearms Information System (CFIS).** This system consolidates numerous internal firearm applications within the California Justice Information Services Division (CJIS), the technology division within DOJ. These applications include the Armed and Prohibited Persons System (APPS), Assault Weapon Registration (AWR), Centralized List (CL), Carry Concealed Weapon (CCW), Dealers' Record of Sale (DROS), and Prohibited Applicant (PA).

**Contacts.** An attempt to locate an APPS individual at a potential current address. During face-to-face contact, agents will attempt a consent search if there are no search conditions due to parole or probation status. Sometimes consent is denied, and agents will leave the premises. If probable cause is developed at the scene, a search warrant will be requested and served that day.

**Dealers' Record of Sale (DROS).** This application is completed by firearms purchasers in California and is sent to DOJ by licensed firearms dealers, which initiates the 10-day waiting period. DOJ uses this information for a background check and the documentation of firearms ownership.

**Ghost Gun.** Ghost guns are firearms made by an unlicensed individual, without serial numbers or other identifying markings.

**Mental Health Reporting System (MHRS).** This is a web-based application used by Mental Health Facilities, Superior Courts, Juvenile Courts, and LEAs to report firearm-prohibiting events related to mental health to DOJ.

**Wanted Persons System (WPS).** This system was established in 1971 as the first online system for DOJ. It is a statewide computerized file of fugitives for whom arrest warrants have been issued.

#### **Statuses in APPS:**

**Active.** Individuals believed to reside in California who are prohibited (state, federally, or a combination of state and federally prohibited) from owning or possessing firearms and have not yet been investigated or are in the process of being investigated, but all investigative leads have not yet been exhausted.

**Pending.** Individuals previously investigated, but that cannot be currently investigated for one or more reasons. The cases are those that have been thoroughly analyzed and all investigative leads have been exhausted. These individuals fall into one of the following sub-categories:

**Incarcerated.** These individuals are in state or federal prison. While they are incarcerated, these individuals are not in Active status. Although technically under Pending status, incarcerated individuals are treated as a separate population for the purposes of this report because it is assumed that they are

not in possession of firearms while in custody and cannot be investigated until they are released. Once DOJ has received notification that they have been released, the individual is moved to the Active status.

**No Longer Residing in California (Out-of-State).** Individuals who were a resident of California, but now no longer live in this state.

**Unable to Clear (UTC).** These cases have previously been investigated by BOF Special Agents and all investigative leads have been exhausted. The individual still has one or more firearms associated with them. If new information is identified, the case will be moved to Active status.

**Unable to Locate (UTL).** These cases have previously been investigated by a BOF Special Agent, but the agent is unable to locate the individual. It could be that the individual no longer lives at the address on file, family and friends are not able to provide useful location information, etc. If new location information is identified, the case will be moved to active status.

**Federal Brady Act Prohibition Only.** Cases where a person is prohibited only under federal law. State, county, and municipal law enforcement have no authority to enforce a prohibition based only on the Federal Brady Act (see definition for Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act for a list of federal prohibitions). Persons who have both a statewide and federal prohibition are not listed in this group.

**Individuals Having Both State and Federal Prohibitions.** If individuals in the APPS have a combination of state and federal firearm prohibitions, then DOJ has jurisdictional authority to investigate the matter related to the state prohibitions (e.g., felons, individuals with California restraining orders, qualifying misdemeanor convictions, and California mental health prohibitions).

## **Appendix B: Legislative History Relative to APPS**

The following provides a brief overview of the legislative history affecting DOJ's Armed and Prohibited Person program from 1999 to present. These legislative changes have exponentially increased the volume of prohibited individuals as the Legislature continues to increase the type and length of prohibitions. Other legislative changes with a substantial impact include evolving statutory and legal definitions as well as increases in the overall regulation of the various types of firearms, ammunition, and parts.

**1999:** APPS was conceptualized by the Legislature as a result of the proliferation of gun violence across the state and the nation.

**2001:** APPS was created in 2001 by Senate Bill 950 (SB 950) in response to high-profile murder cases involving people prohibited from owning firearms.

**2006:** The APPS database went into effect.

**2013:** SB 140 passed the Legislature and appropriated \$24,000,000 from the Dealer Record of Sale Special Fund to DOJ for three years to reduce the volume of pending APPS investigations.

**2014:** Effective January 1, 2014, a new California law (Assembly Bill 809, Stats. 2011, ch. 745) mandated DOJ collect and retain firearm transaction information for all types of firearms, including long guns.

**2015:** After a 2013 audit by the Bureau of State Audits, DOJ finished manually inputting all of the cases into the APPS database.

**2016:** SB 140 funding expired. Effective January 1, 2016, AB 1014 created the new prohibitory category of the Gun Violence Restraining Order.

**2018:** Effective January 1, 2018, AB 785 added Penal Code section 422.6 (Criminal Threats) to the list of prohibiting misdemeanors. Effective July 1, 2018, AB 857 required DOJ to begin issuing serial numbers for firearms manufactured by unlicensed individuals after a successful background check of the owner. The background checks associated with this process identified additional prohibited persons.

**2019:** Effective July 1, 2019, SB 1235 and Proposition 63 required ammunition to be sold only to an individual whose information matches an entry in the Automated Firearms System and who is eligible to possess ammunition, with some exceptions. It also required ammunition vendors to electronically submit to a database known as the Ammunition Purchase Records File, and thus to DOJ, information regarding all ammunition sales and transfers.

Additionally, AB 3129 prohibited a person from ever possessing a firearm if that person is convicted of a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code Section 273.5 regarding the willful infliction of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a spouse, cohabitant or other specified person. SB 746 required new California residents to, within 60 days of becoming a resident, apply for a unique serial number or other identifying mark for any unserialized firearm the resident manufactured or otherwise owns and intends to possess in California. SB 1100 prohibited the sale, supplying, delivery or giving possession or control of any firearm by a licensed dealer, with some exceptions, to any person under 21 years of age. SB 1200 expanded the definition of ammunition for the purposes of the Gun Violence Restraining Order law.

SB 94 provided updated requirements regarding the mandated reporting of the APPS database statistics. It required DOJ to report no later than April 1, 2020, and no later than April 1 of each year

thereafter, to the Joint Legislative Budget Committee and the fiscal committees of each house of the Legislature on information related to the APPS database, as listed in Penal Code section 30012.

**2020:** Effective January 1, 2020, AB 1968 subjected individuals who have been taken into custody, assessed and admitted to a designated mental health facility twice within a one-year period, because they are a danger to self or others as a result of a mental health disorder, to a lifetime firearms prohibition subject to a petition for, and hearing on, a reinstatement of firearm ownership rights.

Additionally, AB 164 prohibited a person from possessing a firearm if that person is prohibited in another state and allows DOJ, partners from other state agencies, and local LEAs to investigate and pursue these cases. AB 12 increased the maximum duration of a gun violence restraining order from one year to between one and five years. It also allows for law enforcement officers to file a petition for gun violence restraining orders in the name of the law enforcement agency in which they are employed. AB 61 expanded the list of individuals who may request a gun violence restraining order.

**2021:** SB 320 codified court procedures related to promoting firearm relinquishment compliance when individuals become subject to civil domestic violence restraining orders (DVROs), including by requiring that courts provide DVRO respondents with specified information about how to relinquish firearms according to local procedures, require courts in certain circumstances to make determinations regarding whether the respondent has complied with firearm relinquishment requirements, and to notify local law enforcement and county prosecutors in cases where DVRO respondents unlawfully failed to relinquish firearms.

The 2021 Budget Act, SB 129, allocated \$10.3 million to DOJ for two years to administer the Gun Violence Reduction Program grant “to support county sheriff’s departments conducting activities related to the seizure of weapons and ammunition from persons who are prohibited from possessing them, including efforts based upon entries in the Department of Justice’s Armed Prohibited Persons System (APPS).”

**2022:** AB 178 allocated \$40 million to the Judicial Council to support a court-based firearm relinquishment program to ensure the consistent and safe removal of firearms from individuals who become prohibited from owning or possessing firearms and ammunition pursuant to court order. The funding is available until June 30, 2025. The first round of funding was distributed in January 2023.

**2023:** Effective January 1, 2024, AB 732 codified requirements that DOJ provide local law enforcement agencies and district attorneys access through an electronic portal to information regarding armed and prohibited individuals identified in the APPS System residing in their jurisdiction. This bill also requires each local law enforcement agency to designate a person to access or receive that information and to report to DOJ quarterly regarding steps taken to verify that individuals identified in the APPS System residing in their jurisdiction are no longer in possession of firearms.

AB 28 establishes a new permanent special fund, The Gun Violence Prevention and School Safety Fund. After July 1, 2025, upon appropriation by the Legislature, AB 28 allocates funding on an annual basis to support multiple purposes related to gun violence prevention, including up to \$15 million annually for the Judicial Council of California to support a court-based firearm relinquishment grant program to be administered in coordination with DOJ to ensure the prompt, consistent, and safe removal of firearms by DOJ and local law enforcement agencies from people who become prohibited as a result of a criminal conviction or other criminal or criminal court order, including court protection and restraining orders.

AB 818 expanded the requirement for law enforcement officers to serve domestic violence restraining orders upon request by the petitioner. This law also clarifies that law enforcement officers must

take temporary custody of firearms in plain sight or discovered pursuant to a lawful search when at the scene of certain domestic violence incidents or when serving domestic violence or gun violence restraining orders and requires that officers report information to DOJ about firearms obtained at the scene of a domestic violence incident or during service of certain restraining orders.

AB 134 also required DOJ to issue the annual APPS Report to the Legislature by March 15 instead of April 1, starting on March 15, 2024.

**2024:** Effective January 1, 2026, SB 899 codifies stronger process requirements for courts and local law enforcement to promote more consistent service, implementation, and enforcement of all types of protection and restraining orders that include firearm restrictions; this law extends requirements that are already in effect for Domestic Violence Restraining Orders to other types of protection and restraining orders that require the respondent to relinquish firearms for the duration of the order. Among other things, this law requires courts issuing protection and restraining orders to provide the respondent with locally relevant information about how to comply with firearm relinquishment requirements; requires law enforcement agencies to serve protection and restraining orders upon petitioners' request; requires courts to proactively review whether the respondent has complied with firearm relinquishment requirements and report violations to local law enforcement and prosecutors; and authorizes courts to issue search warrants for officers to search for and recover firearms from an individual who illegally possesses them in violation of the court protection order and state law. These provisions are designed to increase survivor safety and ensure that people subject to court protection and restraining orders do not become or remain illegally armed.

AB 2907 enacted similar provisions to those enacted in SB 899 governing firearm relinquishment in the context of certain criminal court protective orders.

AB 3083 requires courts, prior to a hearing on a request for a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (DVRO), to check information maintained in DOJ's Automated Firearms System to determine whether the respondent who would be subject to the DVRO is identified as owning or possessing firearms in DOJ's records. This provision is designed to ensure that courts can more proactively ensure that DVRO respondents who already possess firearms promptly relinquish those weapons.

SB 1002 enacted provisions to promote more standard relinquishment timelines and processes for individuals who become legally prohibited from keeping firearms and ammunition as a result of a mental health-related prohibiting event.



## Appendix C: Mandated Statistics – At a Glance

**[1] The Total Number of Individuals in the APPS Database and the Number of Cases which Are Active and Pending:** APPS has 3,633,975 individuals as of January 1, 2025. Of those individuals, 25,911 are prohibited from owning or possessing firearms, with 10,044 Active cases and 15,867 Pending cases.

**[A][i] For Active Cases, the Number of Cases That Have Not Been Actively Investigated for 12 Months or Longer, Along with a Breakdown of the Time Period That Has Elapsed since a Case Was Added to the System:** The APPS database is an outdated system that does not have the capability to track the time elapsed between a case entering the APPS database to when a case was last worked. As a result, DOJ does not have the ability to gather and report the requested information.

**[B] For Pending Cases, DOJ Shall Separately Report the Number of Cases That Are Unable to Be Cleared, Unable to Be Located, Related to Out-of-State Individuals, Related to Only Federal Firearms Prohibitions, and Related to Incarcerated Individuals:** Of the 15,867 prohibited persons designated as Pending cases, 7,113 (44.8%) were unable to be cleared, 2,766 (17.4%) were unable to be located, 4,269 (26.9%) moved out of state, and 1,719 (11%) were prohibited under federal prohibitions only. Additionally, there are 1,260 incarcerated individuals.

**[2] The Number of Individuals Added to the APPS Database:** Between January 1, 2024, and January 1, 2025, there were 12,019 additional known firearm owners who became prohibited. In the same time period, there were 9,559 individuals removed from the prohibited category. This resulted in the total number of armed and prohibited individuals increasing by 2,460.

**[3] The Number of Individuals Removed from the APPS Database, including a Breakdown of the Basis on Which They Were Removed:**

*Table 3: Removals of Prohibited Persons in 2024 Separated by Reason for Removal*

Reason for Removal	Number of Individuals Removed
Prohibition expired/no longer prohibited	5,178
Disassociated from all known firearms	4,058
Deceased	323

**[4] The Degree to Which the Backlog in the APPS Has Been Reduced or Eliminated:**

Penal Code section 30012, subdivision(a)(4) defines “backlog” as being cases for which DOJ did not initiate an investigation within six months of the case being added to the APPS database or has not completed investigatory work within six months of initiating an investigation on the case. The APPS database does not have the technological capability of tracking the amount of time a case has been in the system. Gathering this information would require that a Crime Analyst review each individual APPS entry, one-by-one and review the notes in each file. Lacking a more efficient way of gathering this information, DOJ will be unable to provide these statistics until upgrades are made to the APPS database.

**[5] The Number of Individuals in the APPS before and after the Relevant Reporting Period:**

*Table 2: The Total number of Individuals in APPS Before and After the Reporting Period Separated by Status*

Status	Before Reporting Period	After Reporting Period
Armed and Not Prohibited	3,466,823	3,606,804
Armed and Prohibited	23,451	25,911
Incarcerated	1,189	1,260

**[6] The Number of Agents and Other Staff Hired for Enforcement of the APPS:** In 2024, DOJ hired nine Special Agents, one Special Agent Trainee and six support staff for APPS enforcement. Two existing Special Agent Trainees were promoted into the Special Agent ranks. DOJ also saw the separation of six Special Agents during 2024 due to inter-departmental transfer and/ or promotion, had one Special Agent promote from within to Special Agent Supervisor, and one Special Agent Supervisor promote from within to Special Agent-in-Charge, leaving DOJ with a net increase of five filled Special Agent positions. DOJ also saw the separation of one support staff for APPS enforcement and three internal promotions resulting in a net increase of six in support staff.


**[7] The Number of Firearms Recovered Due to Enforcement of the APPS:** In 2024, BOF Agents recovered 881 (58%) APPS firearms (i.e., firearms known in the APPS database), and 639 (42%) non- APPS firearms not associated with APPS individuals, for a total of 1,520 firearms recovered.

**[8] The Number of Contacts Made during the APPS Enforcement Efforts:** In 2024, agents made 25,500 contacts based on an average of three contacts per individual per case while working APPS investigations.

**[9] Information regarding Task Forces or Collaboration with Local Law Enforcement on Reducing the APPS File or Backlog:**

DOJ takes pride in its collaborative efforts with law enforcement partners. These efforts include leading the CASE Task Force and the TARGET Task Force, participating in the Ventura GVRP Task Force, and joint APPS sweeps with specific jurisdictions based on workload, and most recently the GVRP in which DOJ has awarded grant funding to county sheriff’s departments to support activities related to conducting APPS investigations.

## Appendix D: Relational Diagram of DOJ's Bureau of Firearms Databases



# APPENDIX E: Firearms Prohibiting Categories



## CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF FIREARMS FIREARMS PROHIBITING CATEGORIES

Persons who fall into the following categories are prohibited from owning and/or possessing firearms under California and/or federal law for the time periods described below. Please note that the Department of Justice provides this document for informational purposes only. This list may not be inclusive of all firearm prohibitions. For specific legal advice, please consult with an attorney.

### Lifetime Prohibitions

#### Convictions

- Any person who has been convicted of, or has an outstanding warrant and knowledge of the same for, a felony under the laws of the United States, the State of California, or any other state, government, or country. (Cal. Penal Code § 29800(a)(1), (a)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).)
- Any person who has been convicted of a "violent offense" listed in California Penal Code section 29905. (Cal. Penal Code § 29900(a)(1).)
- Any person with two or more convictions for exhibiting any firearm in a rude, angry, or threatening manner in the presence of another person, except in self-defense, in violation of Penal Code section 417, subdivision (a)(2). (Cal. Penal Code § 29800(a)(2).)
- Any person convicted of a misdemeanor violation of the following offenses:
  - Assault with a firearm. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 29800(a)(1), 23515(a), 245(a)(2).)
  - Assault with a machinegun, assault weapon, or .50 BMG rifle. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 29800(a)(1), 23515(a), 245(a)(3).)
  - Shooting at an inhabited dwelling house, housecar, or camper, or at an occupied building, vehicle, or aircraft. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 29800(a)(1), 23515(b), 246.)
  - Exhibiting any firearm in a rude, angry, or threatening manner in the presence of a peace officer. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 29800(a)(1), 23515(d), 417(c).)
  - Inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or significant other under California Penal Code section 273.5, if convicted on or after January 1, 2019. (Cal. Penal Code § 29805(b).)
- Any person who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).)

#### Mental Health

- Any person who is found by a court of any state to be a danger to others because of a mental disorder or mental illness. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8103(a).)
- Any person who is found by a court of any state to be a mentally disordered sex offender. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8103(a).)
- Any person who is found by a state or federal court to be not guilty by reason of insanity. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8103(b), (c).)
- Any person who is found by a state or federal court to be mentally incompetent to stand trial. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8103(d).)
- Any person who, within one year, is taken into custody two or more times as a danger to self or others under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 and assessed and admitted to a mental health facility. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8103(f)(1)(B).)



## CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF FIREARMS FIREARMS PROHIBITING CATEGORIES

- Any person who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution. (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); 27 C.F.R § 478.11 (defining "adjudicated as a mental defective" and "committed to a mental institution").)

### *Miscellaneous*

- Any person who is a fugitive from justice. (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2).)
- Any person who is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States, or admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (subject to certain exceptions). (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).)
- Any person who has been discharged from the military under dishonorable conditions. (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(6).)
- Any person who has renounced their United States citizenship. (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(7).)

### **10-Year Prohibitions**

When a person has been convicted of, or has an outstanding warrant and knowledge of the same for, a misdemeanor violation of any of the offenses listed below (Cal. Penal Code § 29805(a), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g)):

- Threatening public officers, employees, and school officials. (Cal. Penal Code § 71.)
- Threatening certain public officers, appointees, judges, staff or their families with the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat. (Cal. Penal Code § 76.)
- Intimidating witnesses or victims. (Cal. Penal Code § 136.1.)
- Possessing a deadly weapon with the intent to intimidate a witness or victim. (Cal. Penal Code § 136.5.)
- Using force or threatening to use force against a witness, victim, or informant. (Cal. Penal Code § 140.)
- Attempting to remove or take a firearm from the person or immediate presence of a public or peace officer. (Cal. Penal Code § 148(d).)
- Knowingly making a false report to a peace officer that a firearm has been lost or stolen. (Cal. Penal Code § 148.5(f).)
- Unauthorized possession of a weapon in a courtroom, courthouse, or court building, or at a public meeting. (Cal. Penal Code § 171b.)
- Bringing into or possessing a loaded firearm within the State Capitol, any legislative office, any legislative hearing room, or any office of the Governor or any other constitutional officer. (Cal. Penal Code § 171c(a)(1).)
- Bringing onto the grounds a loaded firearm, or possessing a loaded firearm within, the Governor's Mansion or residence of any other constitutional officer. (Cal. Penal Code § 171d.)
- Knowingly supplying, selling, or giving possession of a firearm to a person to commit a felony while actively participating in a criminal street gang. (Cal. Penal Code § 186.28.)
- Assault. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 240, 241.)
- Battery. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 242, 243.)
- Sexual Battery. (Cal. Penal Code § 243.4.)
- Assault with a stun gun or taser weapon. (Cal. Penal Code § 244.5.)
- Assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm, or assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1), (4).)
- When the victim is a school employee engaged in performance of duties, assault with a firearm, assault with a deadly weapon or instrument, assault by any means likely to produce great bodily injury, or assault with a stun gun or taser. (Cal. Penal Code § 245.5.)



## CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF FIREARMS FIREARMS PROHIBITING CATEGORIES

- Discharging a firearm or BB gun in a grossly negligent manner. (Cal. Penal Code § 246.3.)
- Shooting at an unoccupied aircraft or motor vehicle, or at an uninhabited building or dwelling house. (Cal. Penal Code § 247.)
- Inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or significant other, if convicted before January 1, 2019. (Cal. Penal Code § 273.5.)
- Intentionally and knowingly violating a protective or restraining order. (Cal. Penal Code § 273.6.)
- Exhibiting any deadly weapon or firearm in a rude, angry, or threatening manner in the presence of another person, except in self-defense. (Cal. Penal Code § 417.)
- Intentionally inflicting serious bodily injury as a result of exhibiting a deadly weapon or firearm in the presence of another person. (Cal. Penal Code § 417.6.)
- Making threats to commit a crime which will result in death of, or great bodily injury to, another person. (Cal. Penal Code § 422.)
- Interference with the exercise of civil rights because of actual or perceived characteristics of the victim. (Cal. Penal Code § 422.6.)
- Possessing a firearm in a place the person knows or reasonably should know is a school zone. (Cal. Penal Code § 626.9.)
- Stalking. (Cal. Penal Code § 646.9.)
- Wearing a peace officer uniform while engaged in picketing or other public informational activities relating to a concerted refusal to work. (Cal. Penal Code § 830.95.)
- Possessing a deadly weapon with the intent to commit an assault. (Cal. Penal Code § 17500.)
- Carrying a concealed firearm, loaded firearm, or other deadly weapon while engaged in picketing or other public informational activities relating to a concerted refusal to work. (Cal. Penal Code § 17510.)
- Carrying a firearm in a public place or on a public street while masked. (Cal. Penal Code § 25300.)
- Carrying a loaded firearm with the intent to commit a felony. (Cal. Penal Code § 25800.)
- Possession of handgun ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor. (Cal. Penal Code § 30315.)
- Unauthorized possession or knowingly transporting a machinegun. (Cal. Penal Code § 32625.)
- As the driver or owner of any vehicle, knowingly permitting another person to discharge a firearm from the vehicle, or any person who willfully and maliciously discharges a firearm from a motor vehicle. (Cal. Penal Code § 26100(b), (d).)
- A firearms dealer who sells, transfers, or gives possession of a handgun, semiautomatic centerfire rifle, completed frame or receiver, or firearm precursor part to a person under 21 years of age, when no exception applies. (Cal. Penal Code § 27510.)
- Purchase, possession, or receipt of a firearm or deadly weapon by a person receiving in-patient treatment for a mental disorder while a danger to self or others, or by a person who has communicated to a licensed psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against an identifiable victim. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 8100.)
- Knowingly providing a deadly weapon or firearm to a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code sections 8100 or 8103. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8101.)
- Purchase, possession, or receipt of a firearm or deadly weapon by a person who has been found by a court to be a danger to others because of a mental disorder or mental illness, to be a mentally disordered sex offender, to be not guilty by reason of insanity, or to be mentally incompetent to stand trial. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8103(a), (b), (c), (d).)





## CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF FIREARMS FIREARMS PROHIBITING CATEGORIES

- Purchase, possession, or receipt of a firearm by a person placed under a conservatorship for specified reasons, by a person taken into custody as a danger to self or others under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 and assessed and admitted to a mental health facility, or by a person certified for intensive treatment under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5250, 5260, or 5270.15. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8103(e), (f)(1)(A), (g).)
- Knowingly bringing a firearm into, or knowingly possessing a firearm in, a juvenile facility. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 871.5.)
- Knowingly bringing a firearm into, or knowingly possessing a firearm in, a Youth Authority institution or camp. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 1001.5.)
- Grand theft of a firearm. (Cal. Penal Code § 487.)
- Various violations involving sales and transfers of firearms. (Cal. Penal Code § 27590(c).)
- Storing a firearm knowing that a child or person prohibited from possessing firearms is likely to gain access to the firearm, if convicted on or after January 1, 2020. (Cal. Penal Code § 25100.)
- While residing with a person prohibited from possessing firearms, failing to keep the firearm secure in the residence in one of the specified manners, if convicted on or after January 1, 2020. (Cal. Penal Code § 25135.)
- Storing a firearm knowing that a child or person prohibited from possessing firearms is likely to gain access to the firearm, and the child or prohibited person accesses the firearm and carries it off-premises, if convicted on or after January 1, 2020. (Cal. Penal Code § 25200.)
- Willfully harming, injuring, or endangering the health of a child, if convicted on or after January 1, 2023. (Cal. Penal Code § 273a.)
- Willfully harming, injuring, or endangering the health of an elder or dependent adult, or falsely imprisoning an elder or dependent adult, if convicted on or after January 1, 2023. (Cal. Penal Code § 368(b), (c).)
- Knowingly helping a person prohibited from possessing firearms to manufacture a firearm, or knowingly manufacturing a firearm without a valid state or federal serial number, if convicted on or after January 1, 2023. (Cal. Penal Code § 29180(e), (f).)
- Illegally carrying a concealed firearm or a loaded firearm in public when certain conditions are met, if convicted on or after January 1, 2024. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 25400(a), (c)(5) - (7), 25850(a), (c)(5) - (7).)
- Illegally carrying an unloaded firearm in public, if convicted on or after January 1, 2024. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 26350(a), 26400(a).)
- Having a prior conviction for a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 29805, if convicted on or after January 1, 2024. (Cal. Penal Code § 29805(f).)
- Maliciously and intentionally maiming, torturing, or wounding a living animal, or maliciously and intentionally killing an animal, if convicted on or after January 1, 2025. (Cal. Penal Code § 597(a).)



## CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF FIREARMS FIREARMS PROHIBITING CATEGORIES

### **Juvenile Prohibitions**

- Until 30 years of age or older, any person who is adjudged a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because the person committed an offense listed below (Cal. Penal Code § 29820):
  - An offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b);
  - An offense listed in Penal Code section 29805;
  - A controlled substance offense listed in paragraphs (B), (C), (D), (E), or (F) of Penal Code section 29820(a) (1);
  - Carrying a loaded firearm in public under Penal Code section 25850;
  - Carrying a concealed firearm under Penal Code section 25400(a); or
  - As the driver or owner of a motor vehicle, knowingly permitting another person to bring a firearm into the vehicle, under Penal Code section 26100(a).

### **Non-Lifetime Mental Health Prohibitions**

- For the period of admittance until discharge from a mental health facility, any person who is receiving in-patient treatment at a mental health facility for a mental disorder and is a danger to self or others. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8100(a).)
- For the period of the conservatorship, any person who is placed under a conservatorship by a state or federal court because he or she is gravely disabled from a mental disorder or chronic alcoholism and the court finds that possession of a firearm would endanger the person or others. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8103(e).)
- For a period of 5 years from the date that a licensed psychotherapist reports to a local law enforcement agency, any person who communicates a serious threat of physical violence to a licensed psychotherapist against a reasonably identifiable victim and the psychotherapist reports the threat to law enforcement. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8100(b).)
- For a period of 5 years after being released from a mental health facility, any person who is taken into custody as a danger to self or others under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, assessed, and admitted to a mental health facility. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8103(f).)
- For a period of 5 years, any person certified for intensive treatment under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5250, 5260, or 5270.15. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8103(g).)
- On or after July 1, 2024, any person who has been granted pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 and found by a court to be prohibited from owning or controlling a firearm because they are a danger to themselves or others under Penal Code section 1001.36(m), until successful completion of the pretrial mental health diversion or the restoration of firearm rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 8103(g)(4). (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8103(i).)
- On or after July 1, 2024, any person who has been granted pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.80 and found by a court to be prohibited from owning or controlling a firearm because they are a danger to themselves or others under Penal Code section 1001.80(p), until successful completion of the pretrial mental health diversion or the restoration of firearm rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 8103(g)(4). (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8103(i).)



## CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF FIREARMS FIREARMS PROHIBITING CATEGORIES


### **Non-Lifetime Court-Ordered Prohibitions**

- For the period of probation, any person who is ordered to not possess firearms as a condition of probation. (Cal. Penal Code § 29815.)
- For the period that the court order is in effect, any person who is subject to one of the following court protection or restraining orders (Cal. Penal Code §§ 18120, 29825; Cal. Family Code § 6389):
  - A protective order under Family Code section 6218, including a Domestic Violence Restraining Order, Juvenile Restraining Order, or Emergency Protective Order;
  - An Emergency Protective Order against stalking under Penal Code Section 646.91;
  - A Civil Harassment Restraining Order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6;
  - A Workplace Violence Restraining Order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8;
  - A Postsecondary School Violence Restraining Order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.85;
  - A Criminal Protective Order under Penal Code sections 136.2, 273.5(j), 368(l), 646.9(k), 646.91, or 1203.097(a)(2);
  - An Elder or Dependent Adult Abuse restraining order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03; unless the order was made based on financial abuse only;
  - A Gun Violence Restraining Order (GVRO) under section 18100, et seq. of the Penal Code, including a Gun Violence Emergency Protective Order under section 18125;
  - A valid order issued by an out-of-state jurisdiction that is similar or equivalent to one of the court protection or restraining orders described above and includes a prohibition on owning or possessing a firearm (Cal. Penal Code §§ 18205(b), 29825).
- For a period of 5 years after an existing GVRO expires, any person convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm or ammunition in violation of a Gun Violence Restraining Order. (Cal. Penal Code § 18205.)
- Any person who is subject to a court order that meets certain requirements and restrains the person from harassing threatening, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner or child. (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).)

### **Miscellaneous Prohibitions**

- Any person who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug. (Cal. Penal Code § 29800(a)(1).)
- Any person who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance. (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).)

## APPENDIX F: Bureau of Firearms Regional and Field Offices



## **APPENDIX G: Case Studies**

### **Richmond Man Arrested for Being in Possession of Machine Guns, Assault Weapons, and Approximately 1,000,000 Rounds of Ammunition While Prohibited Due to a Workplace Violence Restraining Order**

In January 2024, the Contra Costa Anti-Violence Support Effort (CASE) Task Force investigated a man who was prohibited from owning and possessing firearms and ammunition due to a Workplace Violence Restraining Order issued against him. The restraining order had been issued after the man brought a handgun to a hospital in Walnut Creek, California and threatened employees. The man had 61 firearms listed in his name in the Automated Firearm System. The CASE Task Force and the Bureau of Firearm's (BOF) Dublin office served a search warrant at the man's residence. As a result of the search warrant, agents seized 11 military style machine guns from .50 caliber to 7.62 caliber, two .50 caliber rifles, 133 handguns, 37 rifles, 60 assault rifles, seven shotguns, 20 silencers, four flare guns, 3,000 large capacity magazines and approximately 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition.





## Monrovia Subject with Criminal Protective Orders Arrested After Being Found with Firearms and Assault Weapons

In March 2024, BOF identified an individual who was prohibited from owning firearms due to multiple criminal protective orders. The person had several firearms recorded in his name in the state's Automated Firearm System. Agents conducted the investigation and obtained a search warrant for the individual's residence in Monrovia, California. As a result of the search warrant, agents seized six handguns, eight rifles (including six assault weapons and one short-barreled rifle), two shotguns, 39 standard capacity magazines, eight large capacity magazines, and approximately 5,000 rounds of ammunition.





## **TARGET Task Force Seizes Assault Pistols from a Prohibited Individual in Tulare**

In March 2024, the TARGET (Tulare County Agencies Regional Gun Violence Enforcement Team) Task Force conducted an APPS investigation of an individual who was prohibited from possessing firearms due to a civil protection order. The individual had five firearms listed in the Automated Firearms System.

The TARGET Task Force contacted the individual at his residence in Tulare, California. Upon contact, task force members observed the individual carrying a concealed firearm. The individual was disarmed and taken into custody. The individual advised BOF Special Agents that he had additional firearms in his residence and gave consent for agents to search.

As a result of the search, task force personnel located and seized five APPS handguns, five non-APPS handguns, two assault pistols, four shotguns, five rifles, seven large capacity magazines, 15 standard capacity magazines, and approximately 700 rounds of live ammunition.



### **Sutter County Woman Found in Possession of Firearms and Ammunition While Prohibited Due to a Civil Harassment Restraining Order**

In April 2024, BOF conducted an APPS investigation into an individual with a Civil Harassment Restraining Order. The individual had one firearm listed in her name in the Automated Firearms System. BOF agents made contact with the subject at her residence in Meridian, California. The subject consented to a search of her residence which resulted in the seizure of six handguns, eleven rifles, three shotguns, 10 standard capacity magazines, five large capacity magazines, and approximately 1,100 rounds of ammunition.



### **Convicted Felon in Clovis Found with Firearm and Ammunition Stockpile**

In October 2024, BOF identified a subject who was prohibited from owning or possessing firearms due to a felony conviction of insurance fraud. The subject had 100 firearms recorded in his name in the Automated Firearms System. Agents made contact with the individual at his residence in Clovis, California and the individual consented to a search of his residence. As a result of the search, agents located and seized 22 rifles, 61 handguns, one shotgun and approximately 38,000 rounds of ammunition.



### **Convicted Felon in Hesperia in Possession of Short Barreled Rifle**

In October 2024, BOF conducted an APPS investigation into a convicted felon suspected of being in possession of firearms. The subject was a felon due to a conviction of vehicle theft. Upon contact at his residence in Hesperia, California, the subject was uncooperative and threatened the investigating agents. Agents obtained a search warrant for the residence and seized two rifles, a short-barreled rifle and approximately 10,000 rounds of ammunition.



### **BOF Removes Firearms from the Residence of a Suicidal Person**

In November 2024, the Fresno Police Department (PD) responded to a call for service regarding a person having a mental health crisis. During the call, the caller threatened to commit suicide using his mother's firearm. Fresno PD contacted BOF after they determined the mother of the suicidal person was prohibited from possessing firearms due to an outstanding felony warrant. BOF obtained a search warrant for the residence of the suicidal subject and his mother. Agents seized one handgun, one rifle, one shotgun and ammunition from the suicidal person's mother.



## Appendix H: Gun Violence Reduction Program Awards

### GUN VIOLENCE REDUCTION PROGRAM

FISCAL YEAR 2022-23

APPLICANT	SUMMARY OF AWARD	AWARD
Kings County Sheriff's Office	Investigate and bring resolution to 67 APPS subjects in Kings County. Research and eliminate firearm transfers that were not completed properly. Collaborate with courts, District Attorney, Probation Department and Parole Offices on subjects navigating through the court system that will become prohibited in the near future.	\$355,686
Lassen County Sheriff's Office	Reduce the number of APPS cases in Lassen County through APPS related investigations as well as general law enforcement investigations. Increase the number of cases filed and convictions obtained in armed prohibited person cases. Reduce the number of stolen firearms in possession of prohibited persons. Work with the courts, District Attorney, Public Defender and Probation Department on identifying persons likely to become prohibited and help in educating the person(s) on their options available to them for legally disposing of or transferring their firearm(s).	\$322,249
San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office	Create a Gun Violence Prevention Team focusing first on subjects from APPS that pose the most risk to the public (e.g., gang affiliations, domestic violence restraining orders, etc.). Determine level of threat of subjects and resources needed (e.g., Veterans Affairs, mental health clinicians, Probation Department, etc.). Work with local entities to address new subjects added to APPS timely.	\$987,072
Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office	Reduce the 1,008 firearms associated with 413 armed prohibited persons in Stanislaus County. Contact mental health prohibited persons regarding firearm possession. Utilize the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network to seek out new offenders that are matched from ballistic data.	\$568,604
Ventura County Sheriff's Office	Reduce the number of individuals in APPS through intensive investigation and focus on recovery of firearms. Improve and make additions to the APPS investigation case management system that tracks, stores and combines data from a variety of sources regarding APPS subjects and investigations. Development of a Pre-APPS program that will allow for the legal removal of firearms from individuals with a qualifying incident (e.g., restraining order, 5150 commitment, etc.) before they are placed in APPS. Check range records, intelligence reports and social media investigation information to help identify prohibited persons in possession of firearms.	\$555,876